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ABSTRACT 
 
The utilization of clinical decision support (CDS) is increasing among healthcare facilities that 
have implemented computerized physician order entry or electronic medical records.  Formal 
prospective evaluation of CDS implementations rarely occurs, and misuse or flaws in system design are 
often not recognized or corrected.  Through retrospective nephrologist adjudication of acute kidney 
injury (AKI) CDS alerts, we identified patient and knowledgebase factors that contributed to 
inappropriate or false positive, alerts.  We also estimated the rate of inappropriate provider responses, 
which occurred in the setting of both true and false positive alerts.  We found that few alerts were 
determined to be inappropriate.  Unintended adverse consequences, or inappropriate provider 
responses resulting from inappropriate alerts, were rare. 
Retrospective review often occurs too late to make critical corrections or initiate redesign 
efforts.  We developed a real-time, web-based surveillance tool for nephrotoxic and renally cleared 
medications that integrates provider responses to CDS recommendations with relevant medication 
ordering, administration, and therapeutic monitoring data.  The surveillance view displays all currently 
admitted, eligible patients and provides brief demographics with triggering order, laboratory, and CDS 
interactions to facilitate the identification of high-risk patient conditions, such as an imminent adverse 
drug event (ADE) or potential ADE (pADE). The patient detail view displays a detailed timeline of orders, 
order administrations, laboratory values, and CDS interactions for an individual patient and allows users 
to understand provider actions and patient condition changes occurring in conjunction with CDS 
interactions.   
We evaluated the surveillance tool with a randomized trial, where intervention patients were 
monitored on the surveillance tool daily by a clinical pharmacist and control patients received only 
 existing CDS and standard of care.  Despite interventions made by the study pharmacist from the 
surveillance tool, we found no significant change in the timeliness of provider modifications or 
discontinuations of targeted medications or occurrence of pADEs or ADEs.  We concluded that clinical 
pharmacist surveillance of AKI-related medication alerts did not improve the timeliness or quality of 
provider responses or patient outcomes. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to new financial incentives within the United States, healthcare facilities are 
accelerating the adoption of clinical information systems, including electronic medical records (EMRs), 
computerized provider order entry (CPOE), pharmacy management, and medication administration 
systems (1).  Many of these systems feature clinical decision support (CDS) functionality to assist 
providers by promoting correct order entry and providing patient-specific recommendations (2).  
Although CDS improves patient care in many settings, CDS failures, such as unjustified provider 
overrides and error-producing conditions within the technology, are frequently documented (3-7).  
Understanding the cause and consequences of these failures is critical to avoiding user dissatisfaction 
with the systems and preventing other unintended adverse consequences, such as patient harm (8,9). 
To further reduce errors, many facilities are implementing surveillance methods, such as e-mail 
messages to notify care team members about changes in patient conditions or computer-generated 
patient lists that are monitored daily by pharmacists (10-12).  Surveillance tools have also been 
implemented to evaluate CDS in real-time, but these have typically evaluated usage in the aggregate 
and not in detail at the patient level (13).  Failures are not often readily apparent outside the context of 
an individual patient care episode, and it can be difficult to differentiate a technical failure from a usage 
failure without sufficient clinical detail presented in tandem with the CDS triggers and user response. 
This project aimed to integrate externalized provider CDS interactions with a real-time patient 
care surveillance tool in order to improve the overall response of the medical team to medication safety 
alerts and improve patient outcomes with reduced adverse drug events (ADEs) and potential ADEs 
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(pADEs).  The study was performed in the clinical domain of acute kidney injury (AKI), which affects a 
large number of patients at various points across all hospital units and services and has numerous 
opportunities for intervention.   
In the first aim (Chapter III), we retrospectively evaluated the appropriateness of existing CPOE 
alerts for medication safety in AKI.  Using these results, we determined characteristics of CDS failures 
and made recommendations for improving drug-laboratory alerting systems.  In the second and third 
aims (Chapter IV), we developed and piloted a web-based pharmacy surveillance tool to allow real-time 
monitoring of at-risk patients and CDS failures.  The iterative process allowed us to create more specific 
criteria for selecting patients eligible for an intervention.   In the final aim (Chapter V), using a 
randomized trial, we evaluated real-time use of the surveillance tool and interventions by a clinical 
pharmacist compared to existing CPOE alerts and standard of care.  We classified occurrence, 
preventability, and severity of pADEs and ADEs to measure an effect on patient outcomes, and we 
evaluated the timeliness and rate of provider modification or discontinuation of targeted medications to 
measure an effect on provider behavior. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
Failures in the Medication Management Process 
Many institutions have implemented computerized systems with clinical decision support (CDS), 
which can prevent errors in all phases of medication management.  However, these systems do not 
always function as intended, and numerous failures have been described.  We define failures as 
instances in which the CDS systems were ineffective, which may be related to provider usage or may be 
technical in nature.  Usage failures are defined broadly as cases in which providers do not adopt the 
advice provided by the CDS (whether justified or unjustified), or misuse the CDS.  Examples include 
disregarding dosing recommendations, overriding interaction alerts, or misinterpreting user interface 
elements leading to an entry error.  Technical failures are defined as errors within the clinical system 
source code, CDS rules or algorithms, or a clinical content, such as an incorrect dose configuration for a 
medication order.  Technical failures are especially common when quality test scenarios inadequately 
simulate live scenarios, such as unexpected missing or out of range input values for calculations and 
alerting logic.  Classen, et al. describe a methodology for evaluating systems that uses simulated test 
patients and scenarios in an attempt to reduce such failures (14). 
Medication errors resulting from CDS failures are common in both inpatient and outpatient care 
settings, and occur at all stages of the medication management process (3-7).  According to Kilbridge 
and Classen, the medication management process has six major segments, each having a distinct 
purpose and list of tasks involved (15). These segments and tasks are depicted in Figure 1 (15).  Within 
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each segment of the medication management process exist distinct opportunities for CDS systems and 
failures. 
 
 
Figure 1: Inpatient medication management process (15) 
 Medication Reconciliation 
The first step in the medication management process is history-taking and medication 
reconciliation, “the process of comparing a patient's medication orders to all of the medications that the 
patient has been taking (16).” Discrepancies or errors in medication lists are common, occurring in 10% 
to 67% of patients (17-25).    Of these discrepancies, 11 % to 59% had the potential to cause harm to the 
patient (19,23-25).  Errors of omission, where a currently prescribed medication does not appear on a 
patient’s medication list, are the most common form of discrepancy (18,19,22-24).  Medication 
reconciliation has been shown to reduce discrepancies, particularly when completed by clinical 
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pharmacists (17,18,20,21,25-28).  For this reason, the Joint Commission began mandating inpatient 
medication reconciliation in 2006 (16).  In 2006, medication reconciliation had been reportedly 
implemented in 71.7% of surveyed hospitals; however the effectiveness of these implementations is 
unknown (29). 
Computerized tools to facilitate reconciliation can reduce errors (17,26-28).  In one approach by 
Partners HealthCare, a Pre-Admission Medication List (PAML) Builder tool facilitates medication 
reconciliation by displaying lists of medication information collected automatically from multiple data 
sources and allowing providers to quickly select items to be added to the PAML.  The tool is used at both 
admission and discharge to maintain accurate lists for patients throughout the entire care process, and 
it has been successful in both decreasing the time and effort required for medication reconciliation and 
reducing discrepancies (26-28).  In a similar approach at Kings County Hospital Center, reported by 
Agrawal and Wu, an electronic tool allows a nurse or physician to complete the medication history step, 
a physician to document the intended action for each medication and generate admission orders, and a 
pharmacist to perform medication reconciliation.  However, to increase compliance, computerized 
alerts reminded physicians to complete documentation, giving a hard-stop if greater than 24 hours have 
passed since the patient’s admission (17).   
Despite the improved outcomes with medication reconciliation and computerized tools, 
discrepancies still occur.  One cause of failure, as demonstrated by Agrawal and Wu, is lack of 
compliance by care team members (17). 
Ordering  
Errors frequently occur in the prescribing or ordering phase of medication management.  Among 
orders placed, 4% to 6% contain an error, with rates varying by medication class and patient or provider 
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factors.  Common errors include wrong or missing dose, frequency, or route.  These errors are most 
frequently caused by a knowledge deficit, such as an unknown patient allergy, decline in hepatic or renal 
function, drug interaction, or other contraindication.  Patient harm is possible in many of identified 
prescribing errors (3-5).   
Numerous studies have shown that medication errors are preventable by CPOE (30-35).  In one 
landmark study, Bates, et al. evaluated medication errors before and after implementation of a CPOE 
system with decision support that required complete orders; limited orders to hospital-approved 
standard doses, names, and frequencies; displayed relevant laboratory results; and alerted providers 
about drug-allergy, duplicate order, and other interactions.  The authors found that rate of medication 
errors, excluding missed dose errors, fell 81 percent (142 per 1,000 patient-days to 26.6 per 1,000 
patient-days) (35). 
Multiple approaches for providing effective CDS in medication ordering exist (2).  Clinical 
systems commonly employ passive alerts that display additional text, change existing text colors, or 
show images, without interrupting the workflow, and interruptive alerts, which require that providers 
acknowledge or respond to the alert before resuming order entry.  These types of alerts may notify 
providers of drug interactions, changing laboratory values, or other information relevant to the patient’s 
medical condition.   
Order sets, a collection of pre-instantiated orders, are an approach for promoting adherence to 
clinical guidelines and efficiency in order entry.  Order sets may ensure that patients with a given 
condition receive appropriate medications and promote drug level monitoring for high-risk medications 
(36).  In some CPOE systems, providers interact with sophisticated computerized modules that generate 
orders that adhere to guidelines and protocols.  These advisors may assist providers with calculations, 
administration intervals, and appropriate laboratory test monitoring (31,37).   
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Failures are common for all approaches to CDS.  Both passive and interruptive alerts may fail 
from usage errors, for example alerts that are ignored or unnoticed by busy providers due to suboptimal 
placement, or frequently overridden (38-43).  Technical failures occur when alerting logic or the data 
sources are flawed such as failures of drug safety alerts to incorporate a history of patient tolerance to a 
drug (38-41,8,44).   For order sets, usage failures occur when providers do not use applicable order sets 
for a given patient condition or deviate from recommendations.  For example, providers may fail to 
order an appropriate drug or monitoring laboratory tests from the order set, or select a reoccurring 
laboratory test from an order set in order to bypass interventions that discourage excessive test 
ordering (45).  Technical failures may include missing, incorrectly configured, or erroneous medications, 
laboratory tests, or other items within an order set; faulty logic that fails to account for existing orders 
and generates duplicate orders; or pre-defined doses that are inappropriate for a patient with 
comorbidities.  Common usage failures for ordering advisors include incorrect inputs for calculation, 
unclear or confusing user interfaces, and incomplete use of the advisor.  Failures can also be technical, 
such as errors in calculations and other logic within the advisors.  CPOE systems can also introduce new 
errors, including more or new work issues, workflow issues, never-ending demands, paper persistence, 
communication issues, emotions, new kinds of errors, changes in the power structure, and 
overdependence on technology (8,9).   
Medication Inventory and Pharmacy Management  
The medication inventory and pharmacy management phases of medication management 
include pharmacy verification, preparation, and dispensing of ordered medications in addition to 
packaging, storage, and formulary management.  Errors may occur due to illegible orders or mistakes in 
the preparation and dispensing of medications.  CPOE systems have played a large role in reducing 
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errors related to illegible handwriting (3,30).  Cina, et al. determined that 3.6% of filled orders contained 
errors, and 79% were undetected by pharmacists (46).  To eliminate some dispensing errors, a large 
number of pharmacies have implemented computerized systems such as carousels, bar coding, 
automated dispensing cabinets (47).  Oswald and Caldwell evaluated the use of a pharmacy carousel 
system and found a decrease in errors with filling automated cabinets, but no immediate effect on other 
errors (48).  Studies by Cochran, et al. and Poon, et al. measured reduced errors and adverse drug 
events (ADEs) in the pharmacy management phase from bar coding systems (49-51). 
Although some positive outcomes have been noted, errors or failures occur with the 
implementation of computerized systems for pharmacy management.  In the first six weeks after 
implementation of the carousel, Oswald and Caldwell found an increase in filling error rates (48).  
Likewise, Cochran, et al. found a large percent of errors caused by bar coding in the pharmacy, including 
incorrect or missing bar codes on medications and overrides of warnings (49). 
Administration  
The next phase in the medication management process is medication administration.  Errors in 
this phase occur in 7% to 54% of administrations (52-56).  Types of errors that have been measured in 
medication administration include wrong patient, drug, dose, route, or time (49,52,55,57).  The rate and 
type of error varies by administration day or time, drug class, drug route, and patient location 
(53,56,58,59).  While some errors cause little or no harm to patients, many have the potential to be life-
threatening (49,51,55,58).   
Many errors associated with medication administration can be eliminated with computerized 
systems.  “Bar coded medication administration (BCMA) is point-of-care system that requires positive 
patient identification and electronic verification of medications at the bedside before their 
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administration (60).” A survey conducted in 2008 found that 25% of hospital had implemented BCMA, 
and use of technology in the medication administration phase is increasing (47).  BCMA has been 
demonstrated to reduce more than half of administration errors (51,53,54,59,61).  In one example, 
Helmons, et al. measured medication errors before and after implementation of BCMA.  The BCMA 
system was integrated with both the pharmacy and CPOE systems, allowing automatic updates of the 
electronic medication administration record (eMAR) and displays within BCMA of medications due at a 
certain time. Nurses used a bedside computer in each patient’s room to select the eMAR and scan the 
bar code on the patient’s wristband to confirm his or her identity, then scanned the bar code on each 
dosage form to verify the medication, dosage form, dose, and administration time on the patient's 
eMAR.  Excluding wrong-time errors, the rate of medication errors decreased by 58% (59). 
Computerized infusion pumps, or smart pumps, for intravenous medications may also detect 
and reduce errors occurring in the medication administration phase (62-64).   Husch, et al. report that 
66.9% of medications observed infusing through an IV pump had an associated error (62).  Wilson and 
Sullivan describe the implementation and use of smart pumps, highlighting the relative ease in 
implementation, the resulting increased safety for patients with heparin infusions, and the use by 
continuing quality improvement to monitor output data and further prevent errors (63).  In a 
prospective, randomized time-series trial, Rothschild, et al. found that, although the rate of medication 
errors did not change, the rate of detection increased with the use of smart pumps (64).  Fifty-nine 
percent of hospitals use smart infusion pumps (47). 
Despite the potential for success of BCMA and smart infusion pumps, errors still occur, and 
many are introduced by the technology, including discrepancies between systems, non-compliance, and 
workarounds (49,52,57,65,66).  Helmons, et al. found that more distractions of the nursing staff 
occurred, patient education decreased, and wrong-time errors increased in some units following BCMA 
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(59).  As described by Flynn, et al. smart infusion pumps can be inappropriately programmed by 
providers as a result of poor design (67). 
Surveillance as a Solution to Preventing Medication Management Failures 
Although surveillance comprises the final phase of the medication management process, it 
allows monitoring for failures in all phases.  Initial methods for understanding failures or unintended 
adverse consequences relied on voluntary reporting of errors by medical personnel and retrospective 
manual chart review.  Bates, et al. identified errors retrospectively using voluntary reporting, 
solicitation, and chart review (4).  However, because of the inadequacy of voluntary reporting and 
manual chart review, and because data necessary for surveillance has become increasingly available in 
electronic formats from CPOE and EMR systems, computerized tools have become useful in performing 
surveillance for medication errors (10-12).   
Classen, et al. developed a computerized system to print a daily ADE report based on 
components for voluntary reporting and automated detection algorithms.  A clinical pharmacist 
reviewed the reports and verified the occurrence of ADEs.  The authors found that the computerized 
system markedly increased ADE detection (11).  Jha, et al. used a similar approach, finding that the 
computer monitor identified 45% of ADEs, manual chart review identified 65%, and voluntary reporting 
identified only 4% (12).  Adapting rules from the previous studies, Kilbridge, et al. developed a 
monitoring system that displaying admitted patients that may require intervention to clinical 
pharmacists using a web-based application instead of a printed report.  The automated system detected 
90% of ADEs, indicating that computerized methods may be sufficient to replace voluntary reporting and 
manual review (10). 
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Commercial systems also exist to facilitate surveillance.  Jha, et al. evaluated the Vigilanz 
Corporation’s Dynamic Pharmacovigilance (DPV), a computerized tool that uses preset rules to monitor 
laboratory and pharmacy data and detect ADEs.  During the trial, 11.3% of 516 high-severity alerts 
generated by DPV were considered clinically important, and 23% of these were associated with an ADE 
(68).   
Similar systems can also be used to evaluate CDS effectiveness (13,69).  Zimmerman, et al. 
displayed retrospective CDS interaction data in a spreadsheet with a dashboard format, allowing a rules 
and alerts committee to evaluate alert effectiveness and make improvements to the system (69).  
Reynolds, et al. developed a web-based graphical dashboard using a commercially available business 
analytics application, which allowed monitoring of order and alert volume by patient location, prescriber 
type, and alert type.  Monthly review of the dashboard by a Physician Informatics Group provided 
opportunities to identify poorly performing alerts and later make system improvements (13).  Despite 
the benefit of these methods, neither allows real-time evaluation of CDS usage at the patient level.  
Data may be difficult for institutions to obtain and use, monitoring personnel may not be available, or 
institutions may not realize the value of implementing such a system. 
Medication Safety in Acute Kidney Injury 
Definition and Significance 
Acute kidney injury (AKI) is a common domain for CDS system development and evaluation.  AKI 
occurs when a patient rapidly loses kidney function such that elimination of metabolic byproducts 
decreases (70). AKI occurs frequently among inpatients and is most often hospital-acquired.  Various 
studies estimate an incidence for AKI in adults of 5% to 17% in hospitalized patients (71-76).  In adult 
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patients who develop AKI during hospitalization, risk of mortality rates may be significantly increased.  
Within intensive care units, mortality rates for patients with AKI range from 62% to 86% (76,77).  Studies 
of hospital-wide mortality associated with AKI estimate rates from 15% to 64% (72,74,78,79).  
International, multicenter studies estimate AKI associated mortality rates from 45% to 60% (71,80). 
Many factors contribute to AKI, including dehydration, surgical procedures, and administration 
of medications or contrast dyes (70,72,74,76,78,81).  In particular, nephrotoxic drugs are a common 
cause of AKI, and aminoglycosides account for a large percent of medication-induced episodes 
(72,78,81).  Careful renal function monitoring with avoidance or reduction of nephrotoxic medications 
may contribute to increased AKI prevention or amelioration. 
Studies report that up to 50% of patients with AKI receive inappropriate doses of nephrotoxic or 
renally cleared medications (61,75,82-87).   Providers with minimal clinical experience in renal dosing 
must rely on expertise from consulting pharmacists and nephrologists or refer to published dosing 
guidelines.  Such resources are often unavailable at the time of initial dosing, contributing to the high 
error rates in renally dosed drugs.  Immediate feedback, whether provided by an expert during rounds 
or decision support during a CPOE session, can reduce the frequency of renal dosing errors (61,82-
85,87). 
Clinical Decision Support Systems 
Several studies evaluated the effects of computer-assisted dosing at the initial order time.  
Chertow, et al. measured the improvement on drug prescribing and patient outcomes of a system to 
adjust drug dose and frequency in patients with renal insufficiency.  When applicable, the CPOE 
intervention notified providers ordering nephrotoxic or renally cleared medications of a patient’s 
impaired renal function, suggesting drug dose amount and frequency from a knowledge base developed 
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by the expert panel and recommending substitute drugs when initially selected medications were 
considered to be harmful.  The results showed that 15% of orders written for renally cleared or 
nephrotoxic medications in patients with renal insufficiency had at least one parameter modified by the 
system.  The fraction of prescriptions written appropriately in the intervention and control periods was 
67% versus 54% for dose and 59% versus 35% for frequency (82).  In response to the system developed 
by Chertow, et al. and in an attempt to maintain educational opportunities through entering orders, 
Oppenheim, et al. developed a CPOE intervention to check the drug dose and interval and alert 
providers after submission and only when the entered dose is inappropriate.  During the intervention 
period, 23% of orders generated an alert prompting a change in the entered dose or frequency, and 52% 
of alerted orders were adjusted (87).  Galanter, et al. created a set of CPOE alerts to reduce 
administration of medications contraindicated due to renal insufficiency.  The authors designed the 
alerts to prompt providers not to complete an order for a drug if the minimum safe creatinine clearance 
was greater than the patient’s most recent estimated creatinine clearance.  Following implementation, 
the likelihood of patients receiving one or more doses of a contraindicated medication after the order 
was initiated decreased from 89% to 47% (84).  Field, et al. found similar results in a study measuring 
initial dosing advice in a long-term care facility, where the relative risk of appropriate final drug orders in 
intervention units compared to control units was 1.2 (88). 
Recognizing that patients often experience changing renal function during their admission, other 
studies developed surveillance systems to monitor for and alert providers about renal function changes.  
Rind, et al. evaluated the effect on physicians’ behavior and patient outcomes of e-mail alerts for rising 
serum creatinine levels in the presence of nephrotoxic and renally cleared drugs, finding discontinued or 
modified doses an average of 21.6 hours sooner than without the alerts.  The relative risk of a patient 
developing serious renal impairment and the mean serum creatinine levels also improved significantly 
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during the intervention period (89).  In a later approach, Evans, et al. developed a surveillance system to 
monitor for excessive doses based on renal function for patients receiving targeted antibiotics, which 
generated a printed list of patients daily that included each patient’s change in renal function, 
therapeutic drug levels, and suggested drug doses.  Pharmacists reviewed the list each morning, 
contacting the provider as necessary to prompt an alteration to the order.  The authors measured a 
decrease in both the number of patients receiving excessive doses (50% to 44%) and the number of days 
patients received excessive doses (4.7 days to 2.9 days) between the pre-intervention and intervention 
periods (83). 
Implications for Real-Time Patient Surveillance 
AKI is a clinical area of interest for real-time patient surveillance for several reasons.  
Hospitalized patients across all units and under the care of providers in different specialties and roles 
are susceptible to AKI.  Occurrence of AKI is also likely to occur at any point during a patient’s admission, 
often more than once, and it is not often identified.  At every stage of AKI, there are potential 
opportunities for intervention to prevent worsening patient conditions.  In addition, medications that 
may need to be discontinued or adjusted in AKI are given at widely varying intervals.  Finally, treatment 
of AKI is not standardized. 
Other patient conditions have similar implications for surveillance, such as renally dosed 
medications in chronic kidney disease or warfarin treatment for anticoagulation.  However, chronic 
kidney disease dosing and monitoring is standardized such that specific alterations are recommended 
for given out-of-range monitoring levels.  Likewise, because warfarin is most commonly dosed once a 
day, in the evening, the time between resulting labs and the next dose to be given is often large, 
allowing providers much time to identify the problem and make changes. 
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Vanderbilt University Medical Center Strategies 
Dosing Guidance for Nephrotoxic and Renally Cleared Medications 
Pharmacy and informatics staff members at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) 
implement and maintain guidelines-based renal dosing nomograms to assist providers in ordering 
renally excreted drugs such as vancomycin.  The order advisor appears when the provider initially 
prescribes vancomycin and recommends the correct dose amount and frequency based on the patient’s 
age, weight, and Cockcroft-Gault estimated creatinine clearance.  In an early study, use of the 
nomogram improved the rate at which patients achieve therapeutic range of vancomycin (85.2% versus 
67.1%) (90).    
Interactive advisors for aminoglycosides are also in use at VUMC.  The advisors support 
extended interval dosing and traditional dosing, providing custom doses and frequencies calculated via a 
pharmacokinetic model using automatically imported demographic and laboratory data, drug level 
monitoring and the opportunity to initiate Infectious Disease or Pharmacy consultations.  All values in 
the advisor may be edited by ordering providers to incorporate information that is not electronically 
available.  An electronic chart review of a random cohort of patients found a significant increase in 
proportion of order dosing and frequency consistent with the expert recommendations (40% to 80% 
dosing, 63% to 87% frequency).  Therapeutic drug monitoring also improved, with a significant increase 
in proportion of trough levels in the goal range (59% to 89%) (91). 
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Computerized Provider Order Entry Interventions 
Intervention Description 
In addition to dosing guidance, early efforts to improve medication safety in AKI included 
intervention alerts that warned care providers about existing inpatient medication orders that 
potentially required a dose adjustment or discontinuation in the setting of a changing serum creatinine 
(42). The target list of drugs that triggered the intervention included a comprehensive list of medications 
in the hospital formulary affected by renal function, as determined by an expert team of nephrologists, 
pharmacists, and infectious disease specialists. The expert panel divided target medications into three 
toxicity levels: drugs that were directly nephrotoxic or should be avoided with AKI, those requiring dose 
adjustments to avoid potentially toxic accumulation, and drugs with a low potential for toxicity but 
which should be reviewed for possible dose adjustments during prolonged episodes of AKI. 
The first alerting mechanism, an initial passive alert, displayed when providers launched an 
order entry session on a patient who had a 0.5 mg/dl increase or decrease in serum creatinine and were 
prescribed a medication on the target list. The second alert was interruptive, and it appeared as 
providers attempted to exit from an ordering session when the provider had not adjusted medications 
in the manner suggested by the passive alert. However, the interruptive alert was limited to patients 
experiencing increasing creatinine levels, prescribed medications with moderate or high potential for 
toxicity, and a baseline creatinine clearance greater than 30 ml/min, as estimated by the Cockcroft-Gault 
equation (92). Thus, providers might receive one or both alert types when a change in a patient’s renal 
function occurred in the presence of targeted drugs. 
 17 
Results 
For patients experiencing increasing creatinine events, the provider response rate increased 
significantly post-intervention for both high and moderate toxicity medications. The greatest 
improvement in provider response occurred for high toxicity drugs, increasing from 40.1 (226 of 564 
events) to 61 (316 of 518 events) modifications or discontinuations per 100 events (p < 0.001). For 
patients with decreasing creatinine events and moderate or low toxicity level medications, the response 
rate to what were only passive alerts did not significantly change from the pre-intervention rate. 
We also compared the time to provider response between the pre-intervention and post-
intervention periods.  The median time between a changing creatinine event and provider response in 
the pre-intervention period for patients with increasing creatinine events decreased significantly for all 
toxicity levels. The greatest improvement in time to response occurred with the high toxicity drugs, 
where medications were modified or discontinued 18.1 hours sooner in the post-intervention period 
than the pre-intervention period (p < 0.001). With decreasing creatinine events, the time to response 
did not significantly change between pre- and post-intervention periods. 
Improvements in the timing of order modifications or discontinuations varied among the 
multiple target drugs evaluated. Medications for gout, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), 
and diuretics were most frequently altered due to the intervention; each showed a 25% increase rate of 
dose modification or discontinuation. While the net change for most antimicrobials was low, ranging 
from decreasing by 3 responses per 100 events to increasing by 13 responses per 100 events, the rate of 
dose modifications increased for each group. 
We evaluated the provider response to alerts generated by eligible medication orders in the 31 
week post-intervention period. Study events (rise or fall in serum creatinine) triggered 1956 passive 
alert/interruptive alert pairs and an additional 886 passive alerts without an accompanying interruptive 
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alert.  After viewing only a passive alert, providers modified or discontinued 26.9% of alerted medication 
orders. Providers clicked the passive alert to view the detailed information screen for less than 1% of 
passive alerts.  
For those orders not immediately modified or discontinued following the passive alerts, 
providers most frequently (78.1%) chose to defer response within the interruptive alert. Providers 
selected the “modify” or “discontinue” options during 4.2% and 3.7% of initial interruptive alerts 
respectively, and selected the “correct dose” option for 14% of initial interruptive alerts. Following an 
initial deferral, providers subsequently modified or discontinued 59% of medication orders and marked 
36.5% as correct; 4.1% of orders were not modified or discontinued prior to patient death or discharge. 
Alerts were often viewed and deferred by multiple team members over the course of hours to 
days. For each event-drug pair, the passive alert displayed to one or more providers a median of 24 
times. For those orders eligible for an interruptive alert, the median number of deferred alerts was 4 
(interquartile ranges: 2-10; range: 1-56) prior to a more definitive response.  
Pharmacy Surveillance of Aminoglycosides 
Intervention Description 
Real time surveillance tools were developed for aminoglycosides as a complement to the other 
decision support mechanisms, to synthesize patient data for a content expert to evaluate, and as a final 
safety net to ensure malformed prescriptions of high-alert medications were not propagated and that 
appropriate dose adjustments and monitoring were conducted in a timely manner (93).  The surveillance 
tool was developed as a python based web application that organizes patients onto dashboards based 
on provider-entered orders for high alert medications. Messages from clinical and administrative 
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systems are parsed and loaded into a MySQL relational database. Scheduled tasks analyze new data for 
patient eligibility, calculate alerts, and compile the appropriate patient characteristics for the 
dashboards. User activity is also logged to the database. 
Results 
During the study period, 12,919 adult inpatient and observation cases were admitted and had 
orders written. Of these, 405 cases (3%) had orders for an aminoglycoside. On average, there were 27 
patients with 8 alerts on the aminoglycoside dashboard.  We recorded 16 individual pharmacists using 
the aminoglycoside dashboard, with nine using it for more than ten days. Distribution of monitoring 
responsibility distributed as 45, 45, 39, 35, 40, 33, 19, 12, 10 days per pharmacist. The dashboard was 
predominantly checked between 0700 and 1600, and coverage was excellent with both monitoring 89 
(99%) of the days. 
At the patient level, 405 cases (100%) were reviewed. The total number of times a case was 
reviewed was 2807 (6.9 times/case reviewed). Pharmacists marked 402 (99%) cases as checked and 
made comments for 373 (92%) cases. Total comments created were 1219 (3.3 times/case commented).  
Official pharmacy recommendations were generated 161 times for 98 distinct cases. The capability to 
launch CPOE directly from the tool was used on 40 distinct cases (46 times). 
Summary and Conclusion 
Despite the success of current implementations to improve medication safety in AKI, room for 
improvement still exists.  Continual overrides of interventions and other CDS failures highlight the need 
for surveillance efforts.  Successful implementation and pharmacy use of an existing dashboard for 
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patient surveillance indicate the likelihood that a similar approach for monitoring AKI and CDS will 
continue to reduce errors. 
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CHAPTER III 
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF ACUTE KIDNEY INJURY MEDICATION SAFETY ALERTS AND 
PROVIDER RESPONSES COMPARED TO EXPERT NEPHROLOGY REVIEW 
Introduction 
Interruptive alerts are frequently used, in addition to other clinical decision support (CDS) 
solutions, to reduce medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) (2,31,30,32-35).  These alerts 
require that providers acknowledge or respond to the alert before resuming order entry, notifying 
providers of drug interactions, changing laboratory values, or other information relevant to the patient’s 
medical condition.  An alert intervention in use at Vanderbilt University Hospital (VUH) was successful in 
improving the rate and timeliness of provider response to medication safety in acute kidney injury (AKI) 
(42).  Despite the success of the intervention, high rates of alert overrides suggested room for further 
improvement.  Prior research has found that many alert overrides are clinically justifiable (40,41).  
Researchers have also found that clinical systems often lead to new errors or unintended adverse 
consequences (8,9). 
With this study, we aimed to define the characteristics of medication-related AKI alerts 
determined to be clinically appropriate by expert nephrology review and, using these characteristics, 
suggest methods for improving future drug-laboratory alerting systems.  We hypothesized that alert 
inappropriateness was explained by patient, drug, and laboratory test factors not accounted for by the 
alerting algorithm.  We anticipated finding disqualifying patient conditions, medication dosing that was 
appropriate prior to alert display, and transient or errant laboratory values.  We also hypothesized that 
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inappropriately displayed alerts may have led to new errors or unintended adverse consequences in the 
form of inappropriate provider responses.  
Methods 
Study Setting 
VUH is an academic, tertiary care facility with over 500 adult beds and 34,000 admissions 
annually at which care providers have used locally-developed and maintained inpatient CPOE and 
inpatient/outpatient EMR systems for more than a decade.  These systems include extensive integrated 
decision support, including dosing advice and alerts about drug-allergy, drug-laboratory, and drug-drug 
interactions (2,94,95).  CPOE alerts about potential AKI appear to providers for patients with a 0.5 mg/dl 
increase in serum creatinine over 24 hours following an active, recurring order for a targeted 
nephrotoxic or renally cleared medication (42). 
Study Population 
Eligible cases were admitted as inpatients to VUH between November 2007 and October 2008 
and received at least one AKI medication alert.  Patients who were identified as a dialysis patient by the 
primary physician or who received hemodialysis prior to the first alert were excluded.  From this cohort, 
300 cases were randomly selected for expert review.  As multiple alerts may have displayed for each 
alerted medication, adjudications were performed on distinct patient-medication pairs, and subsequent 
alerts on the same pair were ignored.  This study was approved by the Vanderbilt Institutional Review 
Board. 
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Study Design 
Two study nephrologists (DC, JW) performed a retrospective electronic chart review of study 
patients.  Each nephrologist reviewed 200 cases, 100 of which overlapped (300 cases total).  When the 
reviewers disagreed, responses were determined by consensus with a third nephrologist (JL).  Prior to 
evaluating the 300 study cases, we performed multiple pilot evaluations of 10 to 15 cases.  The pilot 
evaluations allowed us to measure initial interrater reliability and to identify scenarios that frequently 
resulted in disagreement.  Throughout this process, we iteratively developed instructions for completing 
the adjudications. The resulting instructions for this review are presented in Appendix A.  All data were 
entered into a web-based data collection tool that displayed patient orders, laboratory results, and 
alerts together and saved responses in a separate research database.   
Outcomes 
The primary outcome for the study was the rate of inappropriate alerts.   Reviewers first 
determined whether an alert display was inappropriate, which we defined as an instance in which the 
information was not clinically relevant and a change of care was inappropriate.  Reviewers then 
determined whether alerts adjudicated as appropriate to display were urgent, defined as requiring a 
response within 48 hours of display.  If an alert should not display or it was not urgent, reviewers 
selected determinants of the inappropriate alerts, including patient, medication, and laboratory 
characteristics. 
A secondary outcome was inappropriate provider responses to the displayed alerts.  
Independent of the reviews, we determined actual provider response and timing electronically using a 
PHP script and MySQL queries.  Reviewers determined whether the provider’s response to the alert was 
acceptable or unacceptable, and recorded the response that they would have expected to be 
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appropriate at the time.  With this data, we evaluated factors associated with responses determined to 
be inappropriate, including inappropriateness of the alert displayed.  We also evaluated factors 
associated with the timing of the response. 
Statistical Analysis 
Interrater reliability for adjudicated variables was calculated using the kappa statistic.  A kappa 
statistic of 0 to 0.20 has been considered slight agreement, 0.21 to 0.40 fair agreement, 0.41 to 0.6 
moderate agreement, 0.61 to 0.8 substantial agreement, and 0.81 to 1 almost perfect agreement (96).  
Univariate comparisons were made with the Pearson chi-square test for categorical variables and the t-
test for continues variables.   
We performed exploratory analyses, using multivariate logistic regression to evaluate the effect 
of demographics and drug characteristics on our primary outcome, alert inappropriateness.  We also 
used multivariate logistic regression to evaluate the effect of alert inappropriateness, demographics, 
drug characteristics, and expected response on the inappropriateness of provider responses to alerts.  
All statistical analyses were performed using Intercooled Stata 9.2.  
Results 
Study Population 
Demographics for the cases included in the study are described in Table 1.  For these 300 cases, 
alerts for 487 initial medication-case pairs that appeared to providers were adjudicated by the 
reviewers.  As indicated in Table 2, though 67.35% of alerts were initially deferred, providers selected 
modify in 13.76%, discontinue in 14.99%, correct dose in 34.5%, and defer in 36.76% of final responses.  
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Actual final responses, independent of the final alert selection, included 30.18% modify and 49.49% 
discontinue.  The median time to response for all alerts was 24.05 hours, and 62.63% of responses 
occurred within 48 hours. 
 
Table 1: Study population demographics for acute kidney injury alerts 
Age (y) 
 
60.82 ± 18.15 
Sex (%) 
 Women 
 Men 
 Unknown 
 
Race (%) 
 White 
 Black 
 Hispanic 
 Other 
 Unknown 
 
Admitting Service (%) 
 Cardiology 
 Critical Care 
 Geriatrics 
 Hematology/oncology 
 Hepatology 
 Infectious disease 
 Medicine 
 Orthopedics 
 Other 
 Renal 
 Surgery 
 Trauma 
 
Intensive Care Unit (%) 
 
35.00 
60.67 
4.33 
 
 
62.67 
15.00 
2.00 
1.00 
18.33 
 
 
17.00 
12.00 
1.33 
8.33 
1.00 
4.00 
8.00 
5.33 
3.00 
0.33 
29.33 
10.33 
 
52.67 
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Table 2: Descriptive evaluation of acute kidney injury alerts 
 Total Alerts 
n=487 
Inappropriate Alerts 
n=96 
Medications to Avoid (%) 
Medications to Adjust (%) 
 
Initial deferral (%) 
 Medications to Avoid 
 Medications to Adjust 
 
Final alert response (%) 
 Modify 
 Discontinue 
 Correct dose 
 Defer 
 
Actual response (%) 
 Modify 
 Discontinue 
 
Response within 24 hours 
 
Median hours to response (IQR) 
 Medications to Avoid 
 Medications to Adjust 
 
Drug or Drug Group (%) 
 Aminoglycosides 
 Antiarrhythmics 
 Antifungals 
 Antigouts 
 Antineoplastics 
 Antithrombotics 
 Antivirals 
 Carbapenems 
 Digoxin 
 Meperidine 
 Nitroprusside 
 NSAIDs 
 Other Antibacterials 
 Sulfonylureas 
 Vancomycin 
206 (42.30%) 
281 (57.70%) 
 
328 (67.35%) 
117 (56.80%) 
211 (75.09%) 
 
 
67 (13.76%) 
73 (14.99%) 
168 (34.5%) 
179 (36.76%) 
 
 
147 (30.18%) 
241 (49.49%) 
 
240 (49.28%) 
 
 
10.7 (3.97, 45) 
41.33 (9.4, 131.25) 
 
 
25 (5.13%) 
8 (1.64%) 
6 (1.23%) 
28 (5.75%) 
1 (0.21%) 
102 (20.94%) 
57 (11.70%) 
29 (5.95%) 
35 (7.19%) 
8 (1.64%) 
16 (3.29%) 
36 (7.39%) 
2 (0.41%) 
2 (0.41%) 
130 (26.69%) 
40 (41.67%) 
56 (58.33%) 
 
72 (75.00%) 
25 (62.5%) 
47 (83.93%) 
 
 
10 (10.42%) 
7 (7.29%) 
33 (34.38%) 
46 (47.92%) 
 
 
25(26.04%) 
52 (54.17%) 
 
33 (34.38%) 
 
 
15.83 (5.22, 100.43) 
53.62 (14.08, 168.5) 
 
 
10 (10.42%) 
1 (1.04%) 
2 (2.08%) 
5 (5.21%) 
0 (0.00%) 
21 (21.88%) 
11 (11.46%) 
6 (6.25%) 
7 (7.29%) 
1 (1.04%) 
2 (2.08%) 
4 (4.17%) 
0 (0.00%) 
0 (0.00%) 
26 (27.08%) 
IQR = interquartile ranges 
NSAIDs = non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis of patient demographic and drug factors on acute kidney injury alert display 
inappropriateness 
 Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval p 
Sex 
 Men 
 Women 
 Unknown 
 
Race 
 White 
 Black 
 Hispanic 
 Other 
 Unknown 
 
Admitting Service 
 Surgery 
 Cardiology 
 Critical Care 
 Geriatrics 
 Hematology/oncology 
 Hepatology 
 Infectious disease 
 Medicine 
 Orthopedics 
 Other 
 Trauma 
 
Drug or Drug Group 
 Antithrombotics 
 Aminoglycosides 
 Antiarrhythmics 
 Antifungals 
 Antigouts 
 Antivirals 
 Carbapenems 
 Digoxin 
 Meperidine 
 Nitroprusside 
 NSAIDs 
 Vancomycin 
 
Reference 
0.62 
0.31 
 
 
Reference 
0.81 
0.15 
2.53 
0.76 
 
 
Reference 
0.35 
0.56 
1.13 
0.79 
1.66 
0.99 
1.40 
1.40 
0.29 
2.04 
 
 
Reference 
2.37 
0.82 
2.98 
1.52 
0.93 
1.22 
1.75 
0.67 
0.75 
0.56 
1.13 
 
 
0.31,  1.22 
0.64,  1.53 
 
 
 
0.32,  2.01 
0.31,  0.69 
0.34, 18.87 
0.31,  1.87 
 
 
 
0.13,  0.91 
0.18,  1.79 
0.94, 13.52 
0.27,  2.32 
0.14, 20.13 
0.15,  6.62 
0.46,  4.29 
0.43,  4.50 
0.03,  2.88 
0.80,  2.57 
 
 
 
0.92,  6.11 
0.10,  6.64 
0.52, 17.25 
0.46,  4.95 
0.37,  2.34 
0.45,  3.36 
0.66,  4.65 
0.72,  6.21 
0.17,  3.40 
0.19,  1.63 
0.59,  2.16 
 
 
0.17 
0.15 
 
 
 
0.64 
0.02 
0.37 
0.55 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.33 
0.92 
0.66 
0.69 
0.99 
0.55 
0.57 
0.29 
0.13 
 
 
 
0.08 
0.85 
0.22 
0.49 
0.88 
0.70 
0.27 
0.72 
0.71 
0.29 
0.71 
Alert Inappropriateness and Non-Urgency 
Interrater reliability for alert inappropriateness was moderate; reviewers agreed for 84.62% of 
alerts (kappa=0.46).  After reaching consensus, the reviewers selected 391 (80.29%) alerts as 
appropriate to display; the positive predictive value was 4.07.  All appropriate alerts were determined to 
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be urgent, requiring a response within 48 hours, so we excluded non-urgency from further analysis.  
Multivariate logistic regression analysis results are shown in Table 3.  For those alerts determined to be 
inappropriate, contributing factors most commonly included no AKI or previously adjusted doses (Table 
4). 
 
Table 4: Contributing factors for acute kidney injury alert inappropriateness 
 Inappropriate Alerts (%) 
n=96 
  
Dialysis patient 
Transplant patient 
Palliative care patient 
Dose already adjusted for acute kidney injury 
Dose is already low and for prophylaxis 
Drug levels are in therapeutic range 
Primary team has documented AKI risk and drug benefit 
Transient AKI 
No AKI - lab error 
No AKI - drug interference with serum creatinine assay 
No AKI - insufficient change in GFR 
Other 
9 (9.38) 
0 (0.00) 
0 (0.00) 
29 (30.21) 
4 (4.17) 
0 (0.00) 
21 (21.88) 
31 (32.29) 
10 (10.42) 
16 (16.67) 
37 (38.54) 
3 (3.13) 
  
Note: Percentages add up to greater than 100, as multiple factors may have been selected for each alert. 
AKI = acute kidney injury 
GFR = glomerular filtration rate 
 
Table 5: Expected responses for inappropriate acute kidney injury alerts and provider responses 
 Total Responses 
n=487 
Inappropriate Alerts 
n=96 
Inappropriate Responses 
n=82 
Should not have changed therapy 
Modify the dose or interval 
Discontinue 
Documentation of indication 
Monitor drug levels 
Monitor other levels 
Other 
114 (23.41%) 
230 (47.23%) 
161 (33.06%) 
88 (18.07%) 
189 (38.81%) 
3 (0.62%) 
7 (1.44%) 
61 (63.54%) 
22 (22.92%) 
13 (13.54%) 
21 (21.88%) 
42 (43.75%) 
0 (0.00%) 
2 (2.08%) 
8 (9.76%) 
43 (52.44%) 
32 (39.02%) 
22 (26.83%) 
19 (23.17%) 
3 (3.66%) 
4 (4.88%) 
Note: Percentages add up to greater than 100, as multiple responses may have been selected for each alert. 
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Table 6: Multivariate analysis of acute kidney injury alert appropriateness, patient demographic, and drug 
factors on provider response inappropriateness 
 Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval p 
Inappropriate alert 
 
Sex 
 Men 
 Women 
 Unknown 
 
Race 
 White 
 Black 
 Hispanic 
 Other 
 Unknown 
 
Admitting Service 
 Surgery 
 Cardiology 
 Critical Care 
 Hematology/oncology 
 Hepatology 
 Infectious disease 
 Medicine 
 Orthopedics 
 Other 
 Trauma 
 
Drug or Drug Group 
 Antithrombotics 
 Aminoglycosides 
 Antiarrhythmics 
 Antigouts 
 Antivirals 
 Carbapenems 
 Digoxin 
 Meperidine 
 Nitroprusside 
 NSAIDs 
 Vancomycin 
0.35 
 
 
Reference 
0.90 
0.76 
 
 
Reference 
0.33 
2.19 
2.58 
1.86 
 
 
Reference 
0.40 
0.80 
1.19 
3.66 
0.23 
1.18 
2.61 
1.62 
2.09 
 
 
Reference 
0.60 
2.91 
2.04 
3.35 
1.26 
0.96 
11.63 
1.35 
1.60 
0.74 
0.15,   0.83 
 
 
 
0.45,   1.79 
0.20,   2.94 
 
 
 
0.09,    1.19 
0.60,    7.92 
0.33, 20.17 
0.01,   4.30 
 
 
 
0.98,   1.65 
0.10,   1.65 
0.41,   3.47 
0.24, 56.60 
0.05,   0.97 
0.28,   5.06 
0.79,   8.65 
0.37,   7.06 
0.77,   5.64 
 
 
 
0.14,   2.59 
0.44, 19.28 
0.56,   7.38 
1.42,   7.92 
0.40,   4.00 
0.21,   4.50 
1.60, 84.62 
0.30,   6.15 
0.60,   4.27 
0.33,   1.66 
0.02 
 
 
 
0.76 
0.69 
 
 
 
0.09 
0.23 
0.36 
0.15 
 
 
 
0.21 
0.69 
0.75 
0.35 
0.05 
0.82 
0.12 
0.52 
0.15 
 
 
 
0.49 
0.27 
0.28 
0.006 
0.69 
0.96 
0.02 
0.70 
0.35 
0.46 
Alert Response Inappropriateness 
Interrater reliability for response inappropriateness was fair; reviewers agreed for 78.06% of 
alerts (kappa=0.37).  After reaching consensus, reviewers adjudicated provider responses to alerts as 
inappropriate for 82 (16.84%) of alerts.  Of these, only 8 (9.76%) resulted from an alert adjudicated as 
 30 
inappropriate.  Table 5 shows the distribution of expected responses that the reviewers selected for all 
alerts and for those alerts and responses considered to be inappropriate.   
Multivariate logistic regression found that inappropriate alerts were significantly less likely to 
result in an inappropriate responses with an adjsted odds ratio of 0.35 (p=0.02).  Alerts for patients 
admitted to the infectious disease service were also less likely to be inappropriate, having an odds ratio 
of 0.23 (p=0.05).   Drugs that were more likely to result in an inappropriate response included antivirals, 
having an odds ratio of 3.35 (p=0.006), and meperidine, having an odds ratio of 11.63 (0.02).  These 
results are described in Table 6. 
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
Using retrospective chart review and consensus by a team of nephrologists, we evaluated CPOE 
alerts for patients with AKI, which, despite a previously demonstrated positive effect on provider 
behavior, had high override rates (42).  We found that reviewers determined most alerts displayed to 
providers were not inappropriate (80.29%), and all alerts displayed were urgent.  The factors most 
frequently listed by reviewers as reasons for alert inappropriateness included no AKI or previously 
adjusted doses.  These results have multiple implications for development of future alerting systems and 
reducing false positive alerts.  Some factors of alert inappropriateness, including chronic dialysis, 
transplant, and palliative care patient status could be used to prevent patients from receiving alerts if 
the data was properly coded in the EMR and queriable by all clinical systems.  Advanced algorithms that 
are able to factor in sufficiently adjusted doses, low prophylactic doses, and drug levels for therapeutic 
monitoring within the normal range may also increase the specificity of alerts.  Finally, alerting systems 
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could be improved by the ability to identify laboratory values that are false due to drug interference, 
laboratory error, or bad draws or to detect changes that may be transient.  Improved specificity of alerts 
is crucial to preventing alert fatigue. 
Though we hypothesized that inappropriate alerts were likely to result in inappropriate 
responses, we found that most inappropriate responses resulted from appropriate alerts.  This indicates 
that most inappropriate responses were errors of omission (e.g. failure to modify or discontinue a 
targeted medication) rather than errors of commission (e.g. incorrectly modifying or discontinuing a 
medication that should not be changed); unintended adverse consequences were rare compared to true 
overrides of the alerts. 
Comparison to Literature 
Prior studies have described and evaluated overrides of alerts, and other work has applied 
qualitative methods to understand rationale behind some failures in CDS systems.  In one systematic 
review, van der Sijs, et al. reported that alerts were frequently overridden for low severity, irrelevance, 
or repeated display (38).  Weingart, et al. found that common justifications for inappropriate alerts 
included clinical insignificance of alert, patient tolerance of drug, benefit of drug outweighing 
disadvantages, and limited course of treatment; 95.6% of reviewed overridden alerts were justified (40).   
Ash, et al. and Koppel, et al. found that introduction of clinical systems frequently caused unintended 
adverse consequences, or the occurrence of new errors (8,9).  Our results, however, show that only 
9.76% of inappropriate responses occurred for alerts that were inappropriate.  Understanding the 
appropriateness of alerts and downstream responses is important for improving patient safety and 
preventing errors, and too few studies have performed such analyses. 
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Challenges in the Evaluation of Alerts 
Numerous issues arose in the process of evaluating the AKI alerting system.  One significant 
issue was the lack of gold standards available for adjudication.  One source of disagreement for 
reviewers was heterogeneity in nephrology training and published evidence, which contributed to 
differing treatment philosophies and expectations.  For example, some reviewers had a higher tolerance 
for risk than others, willing to wait for further changes in serum creatinine before determining alert 
appropriateness or urgency.  Similarly, lack of gold standard in treatment caused disagreement among 
the reviewers.  No standards exist for prescribing and dosing nephrotoxic and renally cleared 
medications in the setting of AKI, where estimates of glomerular filtration rate are often inaccurate; 
various methods are deemed acceptable in practice, and determining whether resulting orders are 
appropriate or should be urgently corrected is often difficult.  With multiple responses determined to be 
acceptable during adjudication, reviewers frequently disagreed. 
Another challenge for evaluation is the presence of information bias.  The nephrologists 
reviewed the alerts retrospectively, and adjudication depended on the availability of information in the 
EMR.  The EMR is typically comprehensive with respect to orders and laboratory values, but narrative 
information, such as patient comorbidities, indication, or historical tolerance was not always readily 
available.  This information gives necessary patient context to the reviewers, describing the thought 
process and methodology for medication ordering and dosing.  Without the necessary patient context, 
reviewers were required to make assumptions, which frequently led to disagreement in the 
adjudications.   
Finally, because of the subjectivity in reviews, lack of gold standards, and missing information, it 
was difficult to create completely objective criteria for evaluating appropriateness and urgency of the 
alerts.  We performed several iterations of pilot reviews to assess completeness and clarity of the 
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questions and agreement among the reviewers.  The final instruction set attempted to unify the 
different approaches taken by the nephrologists in reviewing cases and overcome many of the 
challenges by including methods for determining the patient’s baseline renal function, variables that 
could be used and time limits for evaluating appropriateness of the alert and responses, and frequently 
encountered exceptions to the rules. 
Limitations 
Our study has a number of limitations.  Because we evaluated only a limited number of alerts for 
medication safety in AKI, our findings may not be generalizable to other CDS settings or clinical 
scenarios.  However, commercial or other custom clinical systems may have similar alerts for changing 
serum creatinine values in the setting of renally dosed medications, and methods applied in our study 
are likely to result in similar findings.  It is also likely that an evaluation of other drug-laboratory alerts, 
such as those for anticoagulant or glucose management, would have similar findings.  Despite these 
assumptions, we cannot determine how well our results externalize to other types of alerts and CDS 
systems.   
Our results are also limited by the type and training of the reviewers performing the 
adjudications.  Because of the many challenges faced in evaluating the alerts, we only assigned 
nephrologists to review the alerts and provider responses for appropriateness.  Perceptions of alert and 
provider response appropriateness may differ by reviewer role and background.  Attending physicians 
may view some alerts as unnecessary at the time of display while interns may find value in the alert and 
deem a lack of response as appropriate.  Similarly, nephrologists may view all renal alerts as clinically 
significant, while internal medicine physicians or surgeons may see the alert as noisy.  Additional 
adjudication of the alerts by reviewers with a variety of different roles and backgrounds would improve 
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the generalizability of the results, perhaps highlighting additional frequently encountered contributing 
factors for alert and response inappropriateness. 
Finally, the retrospective bias and other challenges involved in evaluating the alerting system 
limited the findings.  A prospective study evaluating the alerts and provider responses in real time would 
allow reviewers to collect detailed narrative data about patients and orders, including indication, 
rationale, and methods for ordering and dosing.  This additional data would provide more informative 
insight on the appropriateness of the alerts and responses, though it is unknown whether we would find 
an increase in appropriateness due to correct provider behavior or a decrease in appropriateness due to 
provider error.  However, such findings might also bias the inappropriateness findings for provider 
responses, as providers may be more likely to respond quickly and appropriately while being observed.  
Our finding of few inappropriate responses resulting from inappropriate alerts may be due to sensitivity 
in the adjudication of alert and response appropriateness by the reviewers.   
Conclusion 
Success of CDS systems is often hindered by high rates of overrides and low rates of adherence, 
though it may increase with improvements to alerting systems.  We developed a novel approach to 
evaluating CDS systems that identifies factors accounting for alert inappropriateness, measures alert 
inappropriateness, includes downstream actions in evaluating provider responses to alerts, and 
incorporates alert inappropriateness in determining provider response inappropriateness.  With this 
approach, we identified contributing factors to alert inappropriateness that could be used to improve 
alerting systems, including consideration of false laboratory values; documented indication, 
understanding of risk, and medication benefit; previously adjusted doses or interval; and therapeutic 
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drug values.  However, because most inappropriate responses did not result from inappropriate alerts, 
other approaches are necessary to further reduce errors.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A REAL-TIME PHARMACY SURVEILLANCE 
TOOL FOR MEDICATION SAFETY IN ACUTE KIDNEY INJURY 
Introduction 
Computerized provider order entry (CPOE) systems and electronic medical records (EMRs) that 
embed clinical decision support (CDS) can improve patient care by providing patient-specific 
recommendations and promoting correct orders (2). However, CDS failures are common, particularly 
during implementation.  Failures include unjustified provider overrides and error-producing conditions 
within the technology (38,39,9).  Rapid proactive response to failures can increase user satisfaction and 
prevent other unintended adverse consequences.   
Many facilities have implemented surveillance methods to reduce errors.  Some surveillance 
systems utilize e-mail messages to notify care team members about changes in patient conditions or to 
inform supervisors about alert overrides, while others create reports of patient drug orders that are 
monitored by clinical pharmacists (10,83,89).  Real-time surveillance tools have also been implemented 
to monitor aggregate CDS use (13,69).   
However, CDS failures are difficult to interpret without the context of the patient care episode.  
The workflow of existing implementations, depicted in Figure 2, has a number of limitations.  The 
informatics personnel developing the systems are disconnected from the clinician.  The need for CDS 
monitoring increases with frequent source code updates, CDS rule modifications, or user interface 
changes.  Also, pharmacist consultations are independent and often contradictory with clinical decision 
support, or they are delayed. 
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Figure 2: Traditional model of surveillance 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Novel model of surveillance 
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A new, novel model of surveillance, depicted in Figure 3, connects pharmacists to providers and 
decision support interactions, and it also allows informatics personnel to view actual interactions in the 
context of an individual patient.  We applied this model in developing a web-based surveillance tool for 
monitoring acute kidney injury (AKI) patients and CDS interactions. 
Surveillance Tool Development 
Surveillance Tool Infrastructure 
Providers at VUMC use a locally developed and maintained EMR and CPOE system along with 
vendor supplied pharmacy management, laboratory, and medication administration systems, each with 
multiple levels of CDS.  Additional locally developed CDS capabilities, such as a laboratory alert paging 
engine for providers and a web-based surveillance tool for clinical pharmacists, supplement monitoring 
of high-risk patients.  These systems rely on an interface engine to synchronize clinical data and prevent 
overload of primary data sources for clinical systems (97).  Log files that are generated by the CPOE and 
other clinical systems record provider interactions with CDS, and data about patient demographics, 
medication orders, medication administrations, and laboratory values are parsed into relational 
databases, which clinical systems or researchers can query.   
The pharmacy surveillance tool is a Python web application backed by a MySQL database that 
contains parsed clinical and administrative messages.  Scheduled tasks query data routed through the 
interface engine from the clinical systems for patient demographics, provider-entered orders, laboratory 
values, and medication administrations.  The tasks then analyze the data to determine patient eligibility, 
calculate alerts, and collect additional patient data to display on the surveillance tools.  A queue parses 
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CDS log files and stores them in a separate database, which is also used by the scheduled tasks to 
populate the surveillance tool.  Figure 4 shows a diagram of the surveillance tool infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
Developers can configure new individual surveillance and patient detail views based on a variety 
of patient conditions or medication orders.  The developer first creates a utility file that evaluates 
patients for inclusion criteria, such as drug exposure or lab results, determines when and for how long a 
patient appears on the tool, and defines patient alerts and other data elements to be calculated or 
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Figure 4: Pharmacy surveillance tool infrastructure 
BCMA = Bar coded medication administration  
CPOE = computerized provider order entry 
CDS = clinical decision support 
EMR = electronic medical record 
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collected, such as inappropriate or out of range orders and laboratory results.  The utility files are 
executed by the scheduled tasks each time the surveillance tool is updated.  Next, the developer creates 
display files, specifying the data elements, display order, and patient prioritization for both the summary 
and patient views.  The display files are parsed by the system each time users view the surveillance tool. 
Surveillance Workflow 
The surveillance tool consists of two primary view types: the surveillance view and the patient 
detail view.  The surveillance view displays all currently admitted patients eligible for surveillance.  In the 
case of AKI, all patients meeting the alert criteria of a 0.5 mg/dl increase in serum creatinine within 48 
hours following an order for a nephrotoxic or renally cleared drug are displayed.  This view allows 
pharmacists or other staff to identify patients at high risk for harm.  As depicted in Figure 5, the AKI 
surveillance view shows patient details such as name, medical record number, providing service, 
hospital location, age, and sex, in addition to creatinine values of interest and alert deferral data. 
The second view type, depicted in Figure 6, shows a patient detail view, which displays a graph 
of events of interest and a detailed timeline for an individual patient in reverse chronological order to 
give context for the CDS interaction events.  The timeline includes all orders, order administrations, 
laboratory values, and CDS interactions during the patient’s admission.  The display can be resorted by 
type, description, value, start time, or stop time to meet the need or preference of the user.  
Surveillance team members can use the patient detail view to understand provider actions and patient 
condition changes occurring in conjunction with CDS failures without having to redirect to and search a 
patient’s EMR.  This view also allows staff to enter comments for reference to viewers at a later time; 
these notes are only available within the surveillance tool and are not a permanent component of the 
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patient’s EMR.  Staff can also use this view to enter notes directly into the EMR; these notes are pre-
populated with patient information that can be edited before submission. 
Pilot Implementation and Evaluation of Acute Kidney Injury Surveillance Tool 
Prior to formally evaluating the surveillance tool for AKI, we performed a pilot implementation.  
The study pharmacists (EN, ZC) and a nephrologist (ES) reviewed select cases during the initial four 
months of implementation (February 2010 to May 2010).  We held weekly meetings to discuss the 
reviewed cases, evaluate the potential for intervention based on various patient and drug factors, and 
assess the usefulness of the surveillance tool.  Changes to the inclusion criteria and surveillance tool 
display were iteratively implemented until team members were satisfied with the product. 
Based on the feedback from the pilot implementation, we made changes to the targeted 
medication list and the inclusion criteria for both the surveillance tool and AKI CDS.  From the targeted 
medication list, we removed tubocurarine.  We added sitagliptin and exenatide as medications to avoid 
and aztreonam as a medication to adjust.  We also recategorized temozolomide and adefovir from 
medications to adjust into medications to review, enoxaparin from a medication to avoid into a 
medication to adjust, and tenofovir from a medication to avoid into a medication to review.  Some 
medications that were ordered frequently for prophylaxis (enoxaparin, acyclovir, allopurinol, co-
trimoxazole, colchicine, valganciclovir, and fluconazole) were excluded when the dose was sufficiently 
low.  Beyond the toxicity classification, all medications were further categorized as targeted for 
increasing serum creatinine, decreasing serum creatinine, both, or neither (i.e. to be displayed to 
provide context only).  The final list of targeted medications is presented in Table 7.  
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Figure 5: Surveillance view of real-time tool for monitoring acute kidney injury patients and clinical decision support interactions
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Figure 6: Patient detail view of real-time tool for monitoring acute kidney injury patients and clinical decision 
support interactions 
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Table 7: Targeted nephrotoxic or renally cleared medications for surveillance 
Medications to Avoid Medications to Adjust Medications to Review 
ACARBOSE* 
ACETAZOLAMIDE* 
ACETOHEXAMIDE* 
AMIKACIN 
AMPHOTERICIN B* 
BENAZEPRIL* 
CANDESARTAN* 
CAPREOMYCIN* 
CAPTOPRIL* 
CELECOXIB* 
CHLORPROPAMIDE* 
CIDOFOVIR* 
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE* 
CYCLOSPORINE*§ 
CYTARABINE* 
DICLOFENAC SODIUM* 
DIFLUNISAL* 
ENALAPRIL* 
ENALAPRILAT* 
ENOXAPARIN* (>30mg Q24H) 
ETODOLAC* 
EXENATIDE* 
FENOPROFEN* 
FLURBIPROFEN* 
FONDAPARINUX 
FOSINOPRIL* 
GALLAMINE* 
GENTAMICIN INJ 
GLYBURIDE* 
IBUPROFEN* 
IFOSFAMIDE* 
IMMUNE GLOBULIN* 
INDOMETHACIN* 
IRBESARTAN* 
KETOPROFEN* 
KETOROLAC* 
LISINOPRIL* 
LITHIUM 
LOSARTAN* 
MELOXICAM* 
MEPERIDINE* 
METFORMIN* 
METHOTREXATE* 
MOEXIPRIL* 
NABUMETONE* 
NAPROXEN* 
NITROFURANTOIN* 
NITROPRUSSIDE* 
OLMESARTAN* 
PANCURONIUM* 
PERINDOPRIL* 
PIROXICAM* 
QUINAPRIL* 
RAMIPRIL* 
ROFECOXIB* 
SITAGLIPTIN+ 
SOTALOL* 
STREPTOMYCIN* 
SULINDAC* 
TACROLIMUS*§ 
TELMISARTAN* 
TETRACYCLINE* 
TOBRAMYCIN 
TOLMETIN* 
TRANDOLAPRIL* 
TRIMETREXATE* 
VALDECOXIB* 
VALSARTAN* 
ACYCLOVIR (>400mg Q12H) 
ALLOPURINOL (>100mg Q24H) 
AMANTADINE 
AZTREONAM 
BACTRIM (>1 DS tablet BID) 
CARBOPLATIN* 
CISPLATIN* 
COLCHICINE (>0.6mg Q24H) 
CYCLOSERINE 
DAPTOMYCIN 
DIDANOSINE 
DIGITOXIN 
DIGOXIN 
DOFETILIDE 
DORIPENEM 
EPTIFIBATIDE 
ERTAPENEM 
ETOPOSIDE* 
FAMCICLOVIR 
FLUCYTOSINE 
FOSCARNET 
GANCICLOVIR 
GANCICLOVIR 
IMIPENEM-CILASTATIN 
ITRACONAZOLE 
LACOSAMIDE* 
MEROPENEM 
METOCLOPRAMIDE* 
MITOMYCIN* 
PENICILLIN-VK 
PENTOSTATIN* 
PRAMIPEXOLE* 
PREGABALIN* 
PROCAINAMIDE 
PYRIDOSTIGMINE 
STAVUDINE 
TOPOTECAN* 
VALACYCLOVIR 
VALGANCICLOVIR (>450mg Q24H) 
VANCOMYCIN 
VORICONAZOLE 
ADEFOVIR* 
ALENDRONATE+ 
AMOXICILLIN+ 
AMOXICILLIN-CLAVULANATE 
AMPICILLIN 
AZITHROMYCIN+ 
BRETYLIUM 
BUMETANIDE+ 
CEFACLOR+ 
CEFAZOLIN 
CEFEPIME 
CEFOTAXIME 
CEFOTETAN 
CEFOXITIN 
CEFTAZIDIME 
CEFUROXIME 
CEFUROXIME+ 
CEPHALEXIN+ 
CHLOROQUINE 
CIPROFLOXACIN 
CLARITHROMYCIN+ 
CLOFIBRATE 
Contrast Dye+ 
DISOPYRAMIDE 
DOXACURIUM INJ 
ETHACRYNATE+ 
ETHAMBUTOL 
FLECAINIDE 
FLUCONAZOLE (>100mg Q24H) 
FUROSEMIDE+ 
GEMFIBROZIL+ 
HYDROMORPHONE+ 
HYDROXYUREA* 
IBANDRONATE+ 
IDARUBICIN* 
INDINAVIR 
LAMIVUDINE 
LEVOFLOXACIN 
MELPHALAN* 
METOCURINE 
MIVACURIUM 
MORPHINE* 
NEOSTIGMINE* 
NORFLOXACIN 
OFLOXACIN 
PAMIDRONATE+ 
PENICILLIN-G 
PIPERACILLIN 
PYRAZINAMIDE 
QUINIDINE 
RIFAMPIN+ 
RISEDRONATE+ 
TEMOZOLOMIDE* 
TENOFOVIR* 
TICARCILLIN 
TOCAINIDE 
TORSEMIDE+ 
ZIDOVUDINE 
ZOLEDRONIC ACID+ 
* Medication only targeted for increasing serum creatinine intervention. 
+ Medication was not targeted for intervention, displayed only on surveillance tool for context.  
§ Medication was not targeted for patients admitted to a transplant unit. 
 
To avoid conflicting recommendations by the study pharmacist, we also refined the inclusion 
criteria by excluding patients on selected services that were already closely monitored by specialized, 
trained clinicians.  Patients admitted to the renal service are cared for by nephrologists, who have 
already adjusted targeted medications.  Patients admitted to the renal, liver, or bone marrow transplant 
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services are monitored by a designated pharmacist.   In these cases, the study pharmacist was not 
necessarily more qualified to adjust treatment regimens for medications such as immunosuppressants. 
Because some patients who met eligibility criteria were determined to be low risk or falsely 
alerted, and because patients could recover from an AKI event, we added functionality to allow the 
intervention pharmacist to categorize patients as “no longer following.”  These patients were sorted to 
the bottom of the display on the surveillance view of the tool to facilitate determination of higher risk 
patients by the intervention pharmacist.  Patients with this categorization remained at the bottom of 
the list for the duration of their admission unless a new trigger medication or change in serum creatinine 
was detected. 
Conclusion 
Traditional methods for surveillance are not sufficient for monitoring patients and CDS failures 
in real-time, but existing systems are easily extended to facilitate such needs.  Using a new model for 
surveillance, we developed a web-based surveillance tool that allows pharmacists and other surveillance 
team members to evaluate patients with AKI in real-time for potential ADEs or CDS failures.  Iterative 
implementation with continual feedback ensured that the surveillance tool worked as expected and met 
the needs of the study surveillance team members prior to a formal evaluation.   
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CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF A REAL-TIME PHARMACY SURVEILLANCE TOOL FOR REDUCING 
ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS IN ACUTE KIDNEY INJURY: A RANDOMIZED TRIAL 
Introduction 
Computerized systems for surveillance can further reduce errors when clinical decision support 
(CDS) within computerized provider order entry (CPOE) systems and electronic medical records (EMRs) 
is insufficient (2,38,39,9,10,13,69,83,89).  However, no prior study has evaluated the use of a real-time 
surveillance tool for medication errors that incorporates provider interactions with CDS.  We developed 
a web-based surveillance tool for use by clinical pharmacists to monitor patients with acute kidney 
injury (AKI), which affects patients across all hospitalized units and for which care and medication 
prescribing is not standardized.  With a randomized controlled trial, we evaluated the effect of daily 
monitoring with the surveillance tool by a clinical pharmacist on the rate, timeliness, and severity of 
intercepted adverse drug events (ADEs) compared to standard care in a setting with wide use of an EMR 
and CPOE with extensive integrated CDS. 
Methods 
Study Setting 
Vanderbilt University Hospital (VUH) is an academic, tertiary care facility with over 500 adult 
beds and 50,000 admissions annually at which care providers have used locally-developed and 
maintained inpatient CPOE and inpatient/outpatient EMR systems for more than a decade.  Also in place 
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are pharmacy management, bar coded medication administration, and pharmacy automation systems.  
These systems include extensive integrated decision support, such dosing advice and alerts about drug-
allergy, drug-laboratory, and drug-drug interactions (2,94,95).  CPOE alerts about potential AKI appear to 
providers for patients with a 0.5 mg/dl increase in serum creatinine over 24 hours following an active, 
recurring order for a targeted nephrotoxic or renally cleared medication (42).  In addition to CDS within 
the CPOE system, pharmacy surveillance of renally cleared drugs occurred during rounds with 
multidisciplinary teams.  This study was approved by the Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board. 
 
Study Population 
The study included all admitted adult patients who experienced a 0.5 mg/dl change in serum 
creatinine over 48 hours of hospitalization following an eligible active, recurring order for one or more 
targeted nephrotoxic or renally cleared medications.  Patients who were dialyzed prior to the first serum 
creatinine change event or identified as a dialysis patient through a dialysis flag order, in addition to 
those admitted to renal transplant, liver transplant, or nephrology services were excluded. 
Targeted medications were categorized into three toxicity groups: medications to avoid, 
medications to adjust, and medications to review in AKI.  These medications were further classified as 
requiring intervention in increasing serum creatinine, in decreasing serum creatinine, both, or neither 
(displayed on the surveillance for context only).  A select number of medications were excluded if the 
dose was sufficiently low for prophylaxis, as these medications were ordered frequently and had low 
potential for harm.  Some medications were also excluded for patients admitted to a transplant service, 
as these patients were monitored frequently by clinical pharmacists.  Patients with only low toxicity 
medication triggers were excluded.  Targeted medications are listed in Table 7. 
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Study Design 
Patients were randomly assigned to appear on a pharmacy surveillance tool at the time that he 
or she first met eligibility criteria.  The patient remained in the assigned intervention or control group for 
the remainder of his or her hospital admission.  The surveillance tool system evaluated all patients for 
internal alerts and inclusion criteria to ensure that comparable data was collected for both groups, but 
only those patients randomized to the study group appeared on the surveillance tool.  All patients 
received previously existing CDS, which included CPOE advisors for initial medication prescribing, CPOE 
alerts for changing serum creatinine in the setting of nephrotoxic or renally cleared medications, and 
pharmacy surveillance of aminoglycosides.  The triggering criteria for CPOE alerts for changing serum 
creatinine mirrored those used for the surveillance tool; all eligible cases received the CPOE alerts. 
The surveillance tool was monitored by the clinical pharmacist for internal medicine (EN).  The 
protocol for making patient interventions is described in Figure 7.  Interventions could be medication 
specific (e.g. for example decreasing the dose) or patient specific (e.g. monitoring the serum creatinine). 
Each workday, the study pharmacist reviewed the patients appearing on the surveillance tool for 
potential AKI, using both the surveillance and patient detail views with CDS interaction data to 
determine the each patient’s level of risk.  For patients determined to be experiencing AKI and needing 
an intervention, the study pharmacist contacted the primary provider to recommended changes in care.  
Patients remained on the tool until discharged; though the study pharmacist could classify patients as 
“no longer following,” and sort them to the bottom of the display.  Patients with this classification who 
experienced another triggering creatinine or who were prescribed a new triggering medication were 
automatically classified as “following” again until the pharmacist re-checked “no longer following.”  All 
interactions, including patient’s classification of AKI, communication with provider, recommendations 
provided, and actions taken, were recorded within the surveillance tool for later analysis.   
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Figure 7: Pharmacy surveillance intervention protocol 
AKI = acute kidney injury 
EMR = electronic medical record 
Outcomes 
We measured a variety of outcomes to evaluate changes in patient safety and provider 
behavior.  We conformed to an intent-to-treat analysis, where cases randomized to the intervention 
group remained in the intervention group whether or not the study pharmacist reviewed the patient 
and recommended a change in care.  Our primary outcome measured the rate of ADEs and potential 
ADEs (pADEs) in the intervention group compared to the concurrent control group.  Based on work by 
Bates, et al., we defined pADEs as incidents with the potential for injury related to a drug, such as use of 
a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug for at least 24 hours.  We defined ADEs as injuries resulting from 
the administration of a drug; these included lab-only ADEs, such as a toxic vancomycin trough level, and 
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actual ADEs, such as a bleed after administration of enoxaparin (4).  We limited measurement of pADEs 
and ADEs to those specific to AKI medications; Appendix B includes a detailed list of pADEs and ADEs 
measured.  We measured outcomes after completion of the inpatient encounter (either by death or 
discharge), evaluating only data existing in the EMR at that time, as outpatient information is not 
routinely available for all patients; pADEs or ADEs occurring after patient discharge were not included in 
the analysis. 
The initial outcomes assessment pharmacist (ZC), blinded to patient intervention status, 
reviewed all cases that met the eligibility criteria using an electronic tool similar to the surveillance tool.  
If no exclusion criteria were determined, the pharmacist recorded patient comorbidities and dialysis, if 
present.  The pharmacist also reviewed each targeted medication order for an associated error, 
following instructions to include record any potential error.  An outcomes assessment adjudication 
committee then independently reviewed cases categorized as having at least one pADE or ADE, using 
methods previously applied to rate preventability and severity (4,23,98).  The adjudication committee 
included a nephrologist (GB) and an internal medicine physician (NP) for initial reviews and an additional 
nephrologist (ES) to break ties when disagreement occurred.  We performed pilot reviews of initial cases 
to ensure that the adjudicating reviewers were in agreement and that the initial outcomes assessment 
pharmacist had identified all potential errors.   
We evaluated provider behavior as our secondary outcome, measuring the time to provider 
response.  We electronically calculated the time from the first change in serum creatinine to 
modification or discontinuation of targeted medications ordered prior to the change (42) and the time 
from the initial order to modification or discontinuation of targeted medications ordered after the 
change. 
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We also measured outcomes describing the use of the surveillance tool.  These included number 
of patients appearing on the tool, number of data items (e.g. drugs, labs, and CDS interactions of 
interest) for patients, time of day the tool was viewed, duration of views, number of patients with 
comments or EMR notes submitted, and the number of patients for which pharmacists intervened.  
Using direct observation and interviews, we collected qualitative data on pharmacists’ use of the 
surveillance tool.  We also evaluated comments and EMR notes recorded through the tool. 
Randomization 
For allocation of cases to intervention or control groups, a pseudo-random number function 
(Python Random) assigned cases a number in the range [0.0, 1.0) during the first update for which the 
case met inclusion criteria.  Cases with an assigned number greater than 0.5 were allocated to the 
intervention group, and cases with a number less than or equal to 0.5 were allocated to the control 
group.  Cases remained in the assigned control or intervention group until discharge.  
Blinding 
All outcomes assessment pharmacists and physicians were blinded to patient intervention 
status.  The intervention pharmacist was aware of patients that were assigned to the intervention group 
but blinded to the list of patients assigned to the control group.  To ensure that outcomes assessors 
were not made aware of intervention status by viewing notes in a patient’s EMR made by the 
intervention pharmacist, outcomes assessors accessed the web-based EMR using Mozilla Firefox (99) 
and the Greasemonkey Firefox Add-on (100) with an installed user script that removed notes generated 
by the study pharmacist from the intervention surveillance tool (Appendix C). 
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Statistical Analysis 
We used the Pearson chi-square test for categorical variables and the t-test for continuous 
variables to perform univariate comparisons between the control and intervention groups.  To evaluate 
provider behavior, we applied survival analysis methods for time to provider response.  We defined an 
event or failure as a provider modification or discontinuation.  We censored cases if providers did not 
modify or discontinue the medication until patient discharge.  For medications ordered prior to the 
triggering event, follow-up started at the time of the triggering serum creatinine change, and for 
medications ordered after the triggering event, follow-up started at the time the medication was 
ordered.  We used the log-rank test to measure the difference between control and intervention groups 
and provided Kaplan-Meier plots for visualization of the data.  Analyses were conducted with 
Intercooled Stata 9.2. 
Results 
Study Population 
Figure 8 is a diagram of the allocation and follow-up of control and intervention cases.  During 
the trial period, 1,767 of 11,128 adults admitted to VUMC experienced a triggering change of serum 
creatinine over 48 hours.  Of these, we excluded 9 cases that had a triggering change prior to the start of 
the trial, 398 patients without targeted medications, 106 cases identified before the triggering event as 
having chronic dialysis, and 411 cases admitted to a renal service or renal, liver, and bone marrow 
transplant unit.  We enrolled 540 cases; 278 were randomized to the control group, and 262 were 
randomized to the intervention group.  During analysis, the initial outcomes assessment pharmacist, 
blinded to intervention status, marked patients for exclusion when they were determined to be chronic 
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dialysis patients (9 control, 8 intervention), transplant patients (28 control, 14 intervention), palliative 
care patients (26 control, 18 intervention), triggered by a false lab measurement (14 control, 17 
intervention), and not have received administrations of targeted medications (5 control, 5 intervention).   
We compared demographic characteristics, including age, sex, race, admitting service, and 
admission to an intensive care unit, and comorbidities, which the initial outcomes assessment study 
pharmacist classified, between the control and intervention groups to ensure that the study groups 
were similar (Table 8).  We found no statistical difference between groups for any variable evaluated. 
 
 
Assessed for eligibility  
(n=11,128) 
Allocation 
 
Analysis 
Enrollment 
Randomized  
(n=540) 
Allocated to control (n=278) 
Control cases analyzed (n=196) 
Excluded 
 Dialysis patients (n=9) 
 Transplant patients (n=28) 
 Palliative care patients (n=26) 
  False lab measurements (n=14) 
 No medication administrations (n=5) 
Allocated to intervention (n=262) 
Intervention cases analyzed (n=200) 
Excluded 
 Dialysis patients (n=8) 
 Transplant patients (n=14) 
 Palliative cares (n=18) 
 False lab measurements (n=17) 
 No medication administrations (n=5) 
 
Excluded (n=10,555) 
 No SCr change (n=9,631) 
 Transplant/renal unit (n=411) 
 Dialysis patients (n=106) 
 No trigger medications (n=398) 
 Prior SCr change (n=9) 
Figure 8: Flow diagram of control and intervention cases 
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Table 8: Study population demographics for analyzed acute kidney injury surveillance cases 
 Control Cases 
n = 196 
Intervention Cases 
n = 200 
P 
Age (y) 
 
Sex (%) 
 Women 
 Men 
 Unknown 
 
Race (%) 
 White 
 Black 
 Hispanic 
 Other 
 Unknown 
 
Admitting Service (%) 
 Cardiology 
 Critical Care 
 Geriatrics 
 Hematology/oncology 
 Hepatology 
 Infectious disease 
 Medicine 
 Orthopedics 
 Other 
 Surgery 
 Trauma 
 
Intensive Care Unit (%) 
 
Comorbidities (%) 
 Cancer 
 Cerebrovascular disease 
 Congestive heart failure 
 Coronary artery disease 
 Diabetes 
 End-stage liver disease 
 Hypertension 
 Mechanical ventilation 
 Peripheral vascular disease 
61.48 (17.74) 
 
 
39.29 
59.18 
1.53 
 
 
72.96 
10.2 
1.53 
2.04 
13.27 
 
 
20.92 
11.22 
2.55 
8.16 
2.55 
1.53 
12.76 
5.10 
2.04 
26.02 
7.14 
 
52.04 
 
 
28.57 
11.73 
24.49 
32.65 
35.71 
4.59 
62.24 
29.59 
3.57 
63.44 (18.30) 
 
 
45.50 
51.50 
3.00 
 
 
69.00 
16.50 
0.50 
0.50 
13.50 
 
 
15.00 
17.50 
2.50 
7.50 
1.50 
3.00 
12.50 
6.00 
4.50 
22.50 
7.50 
 
57.00 
 
 
22.50 
14.50 
26.00 
34.00 
41.50 
4.00 
67.00 
25.50 
7.50 
0.28 
 
 
0.21 
0.12 
0.33 
 
 
0.39 
0.06 
0.31 
0.17 
0.95 
 
 
0.13 
0.08 
0.97 
0.81 
0.46 
0.33 
0.94 
0.70 
0.17 
0.41 
0.89 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.17 
0.42 
0.73 
0.78 
0.24 
0.77 
0.32 
0.36 
0.09 
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Evaluation of Adverse Drug Events 
Initial outcomes assessment included 196 control cases with 1303 medication orders and 200 
intervention cases with 1396 medication orders.  The initial outcomes assessment pharmacist indicated 
that 77 (39.29%) control and 70 (35%) intervention cases had experienced a pADE or ADE.  For individual 
orders, the initial outcomes assessment pharmacist indicated that 111 (8.52%) control and 115 (8.24%) 
had an associated pADE or ADE.   
Agreement between the two initial outcomes adjudication physicians was 92.19% for pADEs and 
91.84% for ADEs.  After reaching consensus, the adjudication committee determined that zero control 
and two intervention cases (one control and six intervention medications) selected in the sensitive initial 
outcomes phase did not have a pADE or ADE; 77 (39.29%) control and 68 (31.00%) intervention cases 
had pADEs or ADEs (RR=0.87, p=0.28) for 110 (8.44%) control and 109 (7.81%) intervention orders 
(RR=0.92, p=0.55), indicating that the adjudication committee agreed with the initial outcomes 
assessment pharmacist for most cases. 
The adjudication committee determined that 44 (22.45%) control and 45 (22.61%) intervention 
cases experienced a pADE (RR=1.01), and 59 (4.53%) control and 63 (4.52%) intervention medication 
orders had an associated pADE (RR=1.00).  Distribution of pADE types is described in Table 9.  Frequent 
responses for pADEs categorized as “other” by the study pharmacist included “dose and interval change 
inappropriate for trough level” and “interacted with another prescribed medication”.  We found no 
statistically significant differences between control and intervention groups (p=0.99 and 0.97 for cases 
and medications respectively).   
The adjudication committee determined that 14 (7.14%) control and 16 (8.00%) intervention 
cases experienced a lab-only ADE (RR1.12), and 16 (1.23%) control and 16 (1.15%) intervention 
medication orders had an associated lab-only ADE (RR=0.93).  Also, 32 (16.33%) control and 24 (12.00%) 
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intervention cases experienced an actual ADE (RR=0.74), and 36 (2.76%) control and 30 (2.15%) 
intervention medication orders had an associated actual ADE (RR=0.78).  The occurrence of lab-only 
ADEs and actual ADEs was not statistically different between study groups for cases (p=0.75 and 0.22 
respectively) or medication orders (p=0.84 and 0.30 respectively).  However, documentation of AKI was 
significantly higher for control orders compared to intervention orders; 52.78% of control orders 
resulted in AKI, and 26.67% of intervention orders resulted in AKI (p=0.03).  Table 10 describes the 
distribution of ADE and lab-only ADE types that occurred.  
 Severity and preventability of pADEs and ADEs are described in Table 11.  Most pADEs were 
significant or serious, and most ADEs were serious or life-threatening.  We collapsed “definitely” and 
“probably” determinations for preventability and found that 7 (43.75%) of control and 4 (25.00%) of 
intervention lab-only ADEs, and 9 (25.00%) of control and 13 (43.33%) of intervention ADEs were 
determined to be preventable.   
Among drugs or drug groups with at least ten orders in the control and intervention groups, 
errors most commonly occurred for angiotensin II receptor antagonists (ARBs), nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), vancomycin, and carbapenems, 22.8%, 20.9%, 12.4%, and 11.7% of orders 
resulting in a pADE or ADE respectively.  Table 12 describes these results. 
 
Table 9: Evaluation of potential adverse drug events 
 Control 
n=1303 
Intervention 
n=1396 
P 
Potential adverse drug events 
 Contraindicated use for > 24 hours 
 No dose adjustment for > 24 hours 
 No interval adjustment for > 24 hours 
 Ineffective at low creatinine clearance 
 Administration error 
 No drug level monitoring 
 No creatinine monitoring 
 Other 
59 (4.53%) 
15 
9 
30 
1 
2 
5 
1 
5 
63 (4.52%) 
12 
16 
31 
3 
1 
5 
3 
1 
0.99 
0.40 
0.17 
0.86 
0.34 
0.52 
0.91 
0.34 
0.08 
 57 
 
 
 
Table 10: Evaluation of adverse drug events 
 Control 
n=1303 
Intervention 
n=1396 
p 
Lab-only adverse drug events 
 Hyperkalemia 
 Hypokalemia 
 Hypernatremia 
 Hyponatremia 
 Toxic drug levels 
 Subtherapeutic drug levels 
 Hypoglycemia (asymptomatic) 
 
Adverse drug events 
 Bradyarrhythmia 
 Hypotension 
 QT Prolongation 
 Cognitive changes/somnolence 
 Delirium 
 Extrapyramidal symptoms/movement disorders 
 Oversedation 
 Seizure 
 Rash 
 Hypoglycemia (symptomatic) 
 Pancreatitis 
 Diarrhea 
 Anemia 
 Lactic acidosis 
 Major bleed 
 Minor bleed 
 Neutropenia 
 Thrombocytopenia 
 Neuromuscular control 
 Vision changes 
 Hearing loss 
 Tinnitus 
 Acute kidney injury 
 Crystalurea 
 Renal replacement therapy 
 Volume overload 
 Respiratory depression 
 Death 
16 (1.23%) 
2 
0 
0 
0 
9 
6 
0 
 
36 (2.76%) 
1 
7 
1 
  2 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
16 (1.15%) 
1 
0 
0 
0 
9 
6 
0 
 
30 (2.15%) 
0 
7 
2 
7 
0 
2 
5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0.84 
0.54 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1.00 
1.00 
-- 
 
0.30 
0.36 
0.70 
0.45 
0.04 
0.36 
0.12 
0.51 
-- 
0.27 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
0.27 
0.80 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
0.03 
0.27 
-- 
-- 
0.22 
-- 
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Table 11: Evaluation of potential adverse drug event and adverse drug event severity and preventability 
 Control Intervention 
Potential adverse drug events 
 Significant 
 Serious 
 Life-threatening 
 Fatal 
 
Lab-only adverse drug events 
 Preventable 
 
 Significant 
 Serious 
 Life-threatening 
 Fatal 
 
Adverse drug events 
 Preventable 
 
 Significant 
 Serious 
 Life-threatening 
 Fatal 
59 (4.53%) 
26 (44.07%) 
30 (50.85%) 
3 (5.08%) 
0 (0.00%) 
 
16 (1.23%) 
7 (43.75%) 
 
0 (0.00%) 
9 (56.25%) 
7 (43.75%) 
0 (0.00%) 
 
36 (2.76%) 
9 (25.00%) 
 
2 (5.56%) 
25 (69.44%) 
9 (25.00%) 
0 (0.00%)  
63 (4.52%) 
27 (42.86%) 
27 (42.86%) 
9 (14.29%) 
0 (0.00%) 
 
16 (1.15%) 
4 (25.00%) 
 
1 (6.25%) 
11 (68.75%) 
4 (25.00%) 
0 (0.00%) 
 
30 (2.15%) 
13 (43.33%) 
 
4 (13.33%) 
13 (43.33%) 
12 (40.00%) 
1 (1.52%) 
 
Table 12: Evaluation of potential adverse drug events and adverse drug events by drug or drug group 
  Potential  
Adverse Drug Events  
Lab-Only  
Adverse Drug Events  Adverse Drug Events 
Drug or Drug Group n Control Intervention  Control Intervention  Control Intervention 
Vancomycin 
Analgesics 
Quinolones 
ACE Inhibitors 
Penicillins 
Antithrombotics 
Carbabenems 
Cephalosphorins 
Antifungals 
Aminoglycosides 
Vasodilators 
ARBs 
NSAIDs 
Digoxin 
Other Antibacterials 
Anticonvulsants 
Antivirals 
Anticholinesterases 
Antigouts 
Sotalol 
371 
353 
350 
231 
195 
187 
157 
109 
108 
70 
64 
57 
57 
51 
49 
48 
42 
26 
23 
22 
14 (8.9%) 
5 (2.6%) 
0 (0.0%) 
9 (7.9%) 
0 (0.0%) 
3 (3.1%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (2.0%) 
1 (2.5%) 
1 (3.9%) 
6 (25.0%) 
7 (13.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.7%) 
1 (4.8%) 
1 (4.4%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (9.1%) 
16 (7.5%) 
7 (4.4%) 
0 (0.0%) 
9 (7.7%) 
1 (1.0%) 
2 (2.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.3%) 
2 (5.3%) 
1 (3.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.7%) 
1 (5.3%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
3 (27.3%) 
 13 (8.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
2 (1.8%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (2.5%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
15 (7.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (0.9%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
 1 (0.6%) 
5 (2.6%) 
0 (0.0%) 
7 (6.1%) 
0 (0.0%) 
3 (3.1%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (2.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.9%) 
6 (25.0%) 
7 (13.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.7%) 
1 (4.8%) 
1 (4.4%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (9.1%) 
1 (0.5%) 
7 (4.4%) 
0 (0.0%) 
8 (6.8%) 
1 (1.0%) 
2 (2.2%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.3%) 
2 (5.3%) 
1 (3.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.7%) 
1 (5.3%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
3 (27.3%) 
 59 
 
Evaluation of Provider Responses 
For medications active at the time of patient’s triggering serum creatinine change or ordered 
after the event, we compared the time to provider response, defined as drug modification or 
discontinuation, using the log-rank test.  We did not find any statistically significant differences between 
the control and intervention groups.  Table 13 shows the resulting median times to response, hazard 
ratios, and p-values.  Kaplan-Meier curves for these results are shown in Figure 9 for medications 
ordered prior to AKI and Figure 10 for medications ordered after AKI. 
 
Table 13: Evaluation of surveillance and provider response 
 Control  Intervention   
 n 
Median Hours to 
Response (IQR)  n 
Median Hours to 
Response (IQR) 
Hazard 
Ratio P 
Ordered prior to AKI 
 Medications to avoid 
 Medications to adjust 
 Medications to review 
 
Ordered after AKI 
 Medications to avoid 
 Medications to adjust 
 Medications to review 
 
106 
100 
126 
 
 
179 
146 
237 
 
27.89 (5.13, 76.87) 
26.21 (4.43, 71.38) 
27.5 (7.8, 51.63) 
 
 
27.82 (13.58, 70) 
46.53 (20.47, 96.68) 
47.5 (20.02, 76.63) 
  
115 
110 
149 
 
 
152 
207 
257 
 
14.17 (3.65, 48.8) 
24.93 (5.17, 65.16) 
26.57 (8.31, 51.53) 
 
 
40.28 (14.78, 81.7) 
32.12 (13.82, 76.23) 
47.5 (22.27, 78.33) 
 
1.12 
1.00 
0.94 
 
 
0.95 
1.22 
1.07 
 
0.45 
0.98 
0.60 
 
 
0.70 
0.09 
0.48 
AKI = acute kidney injury 
IQR = interquartile ranges
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Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier curves for time to provider response by intervention group for medications ordered prior 
to acute kidney injury 
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Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier curves for time to provider response by intervention group for medications ordered 
after acute kidney injury 
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Study Pharmacist Interactions with the Surveillance Tool 
Using both quantitative analyses of surveillance tool usage logs and qualitative analysis using 
observation, we evaluated the study pharmacist’s interactions with the surveillance tool.  During the 3-
month study period, 262 intervention patients appeared on the surveillance tool.  The study pharmacist 
viewed the surveillance tool on 67 days, 56 of which (83.58%) were weekdays.  Although monitoring 
occurred often between 08:00 and 16:00, the study pharmacist preferred to check the surveillance tool 
in the afternoon once providing teams had completed rounds, updated medication orders, and entered 
EMR notes, and laboratory results had returned.  On Mondays or other days for which the surveillance 
tool had not been monitored for days prior, full review took longer, as more new patients who did not 
require following appeared.  During the week for which times were recorded, the pharmacist spent 71 
minutes monitoring the surveillance tool on Monday, and a mean of 16.75 minutes on the remaining 
days (25 on Tuesday, 9 on Wednesday, 15 on Thursday, and 18 on Friday).   
When reviewing patients, the study pharmacist evaluated the serum creatinine trend, the most 
recent creatinine clearance estimate, and the active orders.  The EMR served as a reference for 
verification of administrations and discontinued medications, and it provided additional patient 
information, including vital signs (e.g. urine output, blood pressure, mental status), cultures, and 
rationale for orders.  In some instances, the patient’s nurse or providing team were contacted for 
additional information.  Though the integrated CDS interactions on the surveillance tool indicated which 
prescribing advice and alerts the provider had previously received, this information did not often impact 
the workflow of the study pharmacist. 
Of the displayed intervention patients, 230 (87.79%) were reviewed by the study pharmacist.  
Patients with no active orders were frequently checked first, as these patients required less time for 
review.  The study pharmacist reviewed an average of 10.75 patients each day the surveillance tool was 
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monitored.  Of the reviewed intervention patients, 102 (44.35%) of the patients remained active for 
monitoring.  Patients were most often removed from the monitoring list if there were no active orders 
and all laboratory levels were in the normal range and not trending towards worse.   
The study pharmacist recommended an intervention for 40 (17.39%) cases (49 total intervention 
recommendations).  Reasons indicated when no intervention was required are described in Table 14.  
Most cases without an intervention did not require a dose change.  The study pharmacist made patient 
recommendations (i.e. recommendations that were not medication specific) for 8 cases.  Patient 
recommendations categorized as “other” (2 cases) included redrawing serum creatinine, monitoring for 
sedation and treatment failure, discontinuing oral potassium, and adding height and weight.  The study 
pharmacist recommended interventions for 71 medications (43 cases).  Medication recommendations 
categorized as “other” (9 medications) included correcting the patient’s weight, holding the medication, 
and monitoring for sedation.  Frequencies of recommended patient and medication intervetnions are 
described in Table 15 and Table 16.   The study pharmacist most frequently used indicated use of text 
pages and verbal communication to contact the providing team; of 52 recorded contact events 28 
included text pages (53.85%), 32 verbal communications (61.54%), and 1 an EMR note (1.92%)  
Providers most often agreed with the recommended changes, and the study pharmacist frequently 
made changes directly in the CPOE system. 
The study pharmacist submitted 157 surveillance tool comments for 102 cases.  The comments 
frequently summarized patient comorbidities, laboratory values and trends, and indications; served as 
reminders for continued monitoring; and elaborated recommendations. These comments remained 
within the surveillance tool and did not appear in the patient’s EMR.  Examples of these types are listed 
in Table 17.  EMR notes were written for 3 cases (4 notes total).  These were most commonly used when 
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the providing team was unavailable (e.g. providing team does not have an attending on campus, or 
provider did not respond to text page). 
 
Table 14: Study pharmacist justifications for no recommended surveillance interventions 
Reason Total Responses (%) 
n=503 
Cases (%) 
n=217 
Dialysis 
Transplant 
False lab measurement 
Transient acute kidney injury 
No active orders 
Palliative care 
No dose change required 
Other 
2  (0.40) 
0  (0.00) 
15  (2.98) 
8  (1.59) 
80 (15.90) 
4  (7.95) 
392 (97.81) 
2  (0.40) 
2  (0.86) 
0 (0.00) 
10 (4.29) 
7 (3.00) 
68 (32.19) 
4 (1.72) 
175 (80.26) 
2 (0.86) 
 
Table 15: Study pharmacist patient recommendations for surveillance 
 Total responses (%) 
n=8 
Monitor serum creatinine 
Monitor serum potassium 
Monitor other 
Other 
3 
0 
3 
2 
 
Table 16: Study pharmacist medication recommendations for surveillance 
 Total responses (%) 
n=99 
 Increase dose 
 Increase interval 
 Decrease dose 
 Decrease interval 
 Discontinue medication 
 Consider alternate medication 
 Monitor therapeutic drug levels 
 Other 
14 (14.14) 
9  (9.09) 
14 (14.14) 
13 (13.13) 
17 (17.17) 
7  (7.07) 
16 (16.16) 
9  (9.09) 
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Table 17: Examples of study pharmacist surveillance comments 
Type Examples 
Summary of patient comorbidities “baseline SCr 1.7-2, zosyn dose okay. Severe CAD and NSTEMI 
medically managed- ACEI acceptable.” 
 
“Pt with heart failure, on milrinone, amiodarone, dopamine. Rec 
dcing levaquin dt qtc prolongation. Cultures back, enterococcus, vanc 
should be sufficient. Will need level at steady state tomorrow.” 
Summary of laboratory values and trends “SCr of 0.48 is outlier.” 
 
“CrCl= 42 today.” 
Summary of indication “patient just had urological surgery, sotalol home dose ok for now, 
lower dose.  levaquin should prob go to Q48 if aki persists, can 
address tomorrow before morning dose given.  no changes today.  
will recheck tomorrow.” 
 
“SCr improved... CrCl calculates to 50-60 ml/min.  Macrobid okay due 
to limited [IV] access and suspected MDR UTI.” 
Reminders for continued monitoring “may need to incr vanc if scr cont to decrease.” 
 
“Will rec decr lovenox to 30 Qd if SCr any higher tomorrow.” 
Elaboration of recommendations “Pt with heart failure, on milrinone, amiodarone, dopamine. Rec 
dcing levaquin dt qtc prolongation. Cultures back, enterococcus, vanc 
should be sufficient. Will need level at steady state tomorrow.” 
 
“talked with team about adjusting sotalol.  Doses have been held due 
to hypotension. Rec Qd administration or told them to consider cards 
consult.” 
Surveillance Interactions and Adverse Drug Events 
Of the 33 patients that received an intervention, 15 (45.5%) experienced a pADE, and 14 (42.4%) 
experienced an ADE.  These rates are significantly higher than those for patients not receiving an 
intervention, with 30 (18.1%) experiencing a pADE and 26 (15.6%) experiencing an ADE (p=0.001 and p < 
0.001 respectively).  Qualitative feedback indicated that ADEs occurring after study pharmacist review 
frequently resulted from patients with borderline criteria for intervention. 
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Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
We performed a prospective, randomized trial of the monitoring of a real-time, web-based 
patient surveillance tool and interventions by a clinical pharmacist to improve medication safety in AKI 
compared to existing CDS and standard of care.  During analysis, despite a number of interventions 
made by the study pharmacist, we found no significant improvements in total patient outcomes, 
including occurrence, preventability, and severity of pADEs and ADEs, or in process outcomes, including 
rate and timeliness of provider modifications or discontinuations of targeted medications.    
Documented AKI resulting from targeted medications was significantly lower in the intervention group 
compared to the control group, though this finding may have be biased from providers being more 
aware of AKI after pharmacist intervention; 7 of 8 documented AKI intervention group patients received 
an actual intervention from the study pharmacist. 
Many factors may have contributed to our negative findings.  Existing CDS for initial dosing of 
nephrotoxic and renally cleared drugs, CDS for monitoring of these medications within CPOE, and 
surveillance by other pharmacists in the event of changing laboratory values results in a large 
percentage of prevented errors.  Because of this, the number of interventions made by study pharmacist 
was relatively low.  Many of the medication orders for patients who appeared for review on the 
surveillance tool had already been adjusted for decreased renal function and did not require an 
additional change.  Though we were able to exclude some medication orders that were sufficiently low 
for prophylaxis, an algorithm that could evaluate orders for appropriate dose and interval for the 
patient’s renal function might improve specificity of eligible patients.  Because errors still occurred for 
patients that received an intervention, the timing of the surveillance and resulting alterations to therapy 
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may not have been appropriate.  An alternate workflow, such as use of the surveillance tool by front-line 
pharmacists approving and dispensing medication orders or by a pharmacist or other provider 
participating in rounds might allow earlier prevention of medication errors and reduction of ADEs.  
Finally, we did not have sufficient power to detect a difference between groups with a low prevalence of 
pADEs and ADEs.  While a difference of 8.39% in cases with pADEs or ADEs was observed between 
control and intervention groups, a sample size with 703 cases in each study group would be required to 
achieve 90% power. 
Qualitative assessment of the benefit of the integrated CDS on the surveillance tool was 
inconclusive, as the study pharmacist did not frequently incorporate the data in the surveillance 
workflow.  Further research is necessary to determine whether inclusion of the data on the surveillance 
tool has an effect on surveillance and outcomes. 
Comparison to Literature 
Many prior studies have evaluated the use of surveillance to prevent pADEs and ADEs, finding 
that systems successfully identify 45% to 90% of ADEs, though these studies have not evaluated the 
effect of systems on actual prevention of ADEs (10-12,68).  Though some investigators have evaluated 
the use of retrospective CDS surveillance and real-time aggregate CDS surveillance (13,69), no prior 
study has evaluated the effect of surveillance of CDS in real time on patient or process outcomes.  The 
restriction of our intervention and analysis to ADEs only related to AKI also makes it difficult to compare 
our results to these studies, which measured all types of ADEs.  However, pharmacy use of the 
surveillance tool for monitoring AKI patients and CDS was similar to use described for a similar tool for 
aminoglycosides and anticoagulants (93).  Our study also differs from prior research in that we 
evaluated the surveillance tool in a setting with extensive existing CDS.   
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Limitations 
A number of factors limit the generalizability of our results.  First, development of the real-time 
surveillance tool required integration with several advanced clinical systems, which many facilities have 
not implemented.  However, a similar tool may be developed, or a commercial system may be installed, 
requiring access to commonly patient census, laboratory, and medication ordering data.  These systems 
have been implemented in most facilities, and data may be shared with HL7 messages or existing data 
repositories.  With external collection of surveillance interaction data, the methods from out study could 
be applied to evaluate alternate systems for surveillance. 
Our results are also limited by evaluation in the single domain of AKI.  Other clinical scenarios, 
including anticoagulant prescribing and glucose management, may also benefit from real-time 
surveillance with CDS, as they depend on laboratory results for proper dosing, and prior work shows 
similar results with effects of CDS in these scenarios. 
Conclusion 
We evaluated the use of a real-time surveillance tool of AKI patients and CDS interactions with a 
randomized trial, where intervention patients were monitored daily by a clinical pharmacist and control 
patients received only existing CDS and standard of care.  Despite interventions made by the study 
pharmacist from the surveillance tool, we found no statistically significant improvements in provider 
responses or occurrence or severity of potential ADEs or ADEs between control and intervention study 
groups.  Further research is necessary to determine whether a larger sample size, improved inclusion 
criteria, or alternate workflow would have led to positive findings.  
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
With this research, we aimed to identify failures associated with medication-related clinical 
decision support (CDS) for acute kidney injury (AKI) and reduce further errors with real-time 
surveillance.  In the first aim, nephrologists performed retrospective adjudication of AKI alerts, 
determining appropriateness of alerts that displayed to providers of provider responses to the alerts.   
We found that most alerts were appropriate but identified a number of factors contributed to false 
alerting that could be improved in future alerting systems, including checks for appropriate drug dosing 
and therapeutic drug levels.  Likewise, most alert responses were appropriate, and those that were 
inappropriate most often occurred for appropriate alerts; providers frequently committed errors or 
omission in the form of unjustified overrides rather than committing errors of commission, or 
unintended adverse consequences.   
In an attempt to further improve timeliness of provider responses and reduce errors, we 
developed and implemented a real-time web-based surveillance tool, which integrates provider 
responses to CDS recommendations with relevant medication ordering, administration, and therapeutic 
monitoring data.  We evaluated the surveillance tool with a randomized trial, where intervention 
patients were monitored on the surveillance tool daily by a clinical pharmacist and control patients 
received only existing CDS and standard of care.  The study pharmacist made some interventions 
through the surveillance during the trial, but we found no statistically significant improvements in 
provider responses or occurrence or severity of adverse drug events (ADEs) or potential ADEs between 
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control and intervention study groups.  This negative finding was likely due to a high baseline of error 
prevention from existing CDS in the CPOE system and surveillance by alternate pharmacists, which we 
previously found to be beneficial and appropriate, and an ineffective workflow for further preventing 
errors.  Further research is necessary to determine whether the surveillance tool would be beneficial in 
clinical settings without extensive CDS or whether an alternate surveillance workflow could have further 
prevented errors. 
Implications 
The findings from both of phases of this research have implications on CDS and medication 
safety.  It is important that CDS is thoroughly evaluated both prior to and after implementation to 
continually improve systems and prevent errors, and our approach is novel in many aspects.  First, we 
evaluated patient factors for triggered alerts to determine appropriateness, which is frequently not 
accounted for in studies of CDS systems.  Prior research has typically described prevalence of alerts, 
ignoring those that may be clinically irrelevant.  Identification of these scenarios and attempts to 
improve the specificity of alerts is crucial in preventing alert fatigue.  Next, we allowed for downstream 
responses to alerts outside of the initial alert context.  Traditional evaluations of alerts report provider 
overrides to the initially displayed alerts and do not account for changes to care made at a later time.  
This is significant, as we have found that providers frequently override alerts for the first display but 
make changes after discussing therapy with the care providing team or consulting with a pharmacist or 
other provider.  Finally, we accounted for the alert appropriateness measure in evaluating responses to 
alerts instead of assuming that all alert overrides are unjustified.  Typical evaluations measure only 
adherence to CDS advice and fail to acknowledge that alerts to not apply to all patients and scenarios.  
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These methods for evaluation could be adapted to fit a variety of CDS implementations, including drug-
laboratory, drug-drug, and other alerting systems, for a number of clinical scenarios. 
The surveillance system that we developed could be implemented in other settings.  Though we 
did not find a statistically significant difference in patient or process outcomes with the surveillance 
system, research conducted in settings without extensive CDS or monitoring, or in different clinical 
scenarios, might result in positive findings.  For example, warfarin doses are frequently administered in 
the evenings, and surveillance during the day would occur in time to identify errors and make changes 
to therapy prior to the administration.  Likewise, an institution without guided renal dosing or alerts 
about decreases in renal function or existing monitoring may not have had a high rate of already 
adjusted therapy prior to pharmacy surveillance.  It is important to identify settings for research and 
workflows for interventions that have a high potential for improving patient care.  
Limitations 
As described in the previous chapters, this research has a number of limitations.  In the first aim, 
we retrospectively evaluated appropriateness of alerts for AKI with nephrologists serving as reviewers.  
These results were limited, as physicians with other roles and training may perceive alerts very 
differently.  While we were not able to evaluate reviews by other physicians for the retrospective aim, 
we did evaluate reviews of ADEs in our prospective aim by a pharmacist, nephrologists, and internal 
medicine physician.  Because we found that these reviewers were able to reach consensus in reviews, 
we believe that additional reviewers of the retrospective alerts may produce similar results, despite the 
difference in content of the reviews.  Our results also depend on implementations of numerous clinical 
systems.  Implementation of solutions for many contributing factors to inappropriate alerts would 
require a CPOE system with integrated laboratory and coded EMR data, which are frequently difficult to 
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obtain and rarely accurate or complete.  Creating and managing a knowledge base with such alerting 
criteria would also be challenging. Finally, because we completed our research in the clinical domain of 
AKI, our results may also have limited generalizability.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Through retrospective expert adjudication of medication-safety clinical decision support (CDS) 
alerts for acute kidney injury (AKI), we identified contributing factors to alert inappropriateness that 
could be used to improve alerting systems, including consideration of false laboratory values; 
documented indication, understanding of risk, and medication benefit; previously adjusted doses or 
interval; and therapeutic drug values.  Evaluation of provider responses to the alerts found that most 
responses were appropriate, and inappropriate responses were most often true overrides; unintended 
adverse consequences rarely occurred.  Additional research is necessary to further improve both CDS 
systems and resulting outcomes, and the framework we developed for evaluating alerts can support this 
research. 
We developed, implemented, and evaluated the use of a real-time, web-based surveillance tool 
for AKI patients and CDS interactions with a randomized trial, where intervention patients were 
monitored daily by a clinical pharmacist and control patients received only existing CDS and standard of 
care.  Despite interventions made by the study pharmacist from the surveillance tool, we found no 
statistically significant improvements in the timing of provider responses or in the occurrence or severity 
of adverse drug events or potential adverse drug events between control and intervention study groups.  
Though we established feasibility of real-time surveillance that incorporates CDS, further research is 
necessary to determine whether a larger sample size, a different clinical scenario with less prevalent or 
effective CDS, improved specificity of inclusion criteria that accounted for therapy that was already 
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appropriate or an alternate workflow that better matched the clinical scenario would have led to 
positive findings, and to determine whether inclusion of the CDS benefits the surveillance. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROTOCOL FOR ACUTE KIDNEY INJURY ALERT ADJUDICATION 
I. Alert Appropriateness Scale 
Definition: Adjudicator’s determination of the appropriateness of the alert displayed for a patient-
drug pair.  Adjudication is made at the time that the alert was first displayed for each eligible 
medication order given the patient’s serum creatinine compared to baseline.  Serum creatinine 
measurements within 48 hours of the alert may be used to identify transient changes and lab errors.  
Drug indication and dosing is assumed to be appropriately determined by the providing team. 
a. Alert Display Axis 
i. Should not display – response would be unacceptable 
ii. Should display – response  would be acceptable 
b. Alert Urgency Axis 
i. Response is expected within 48 hours of initial display  
ii. Response may be delayed greater than 48 hours after initial display 
I. Contributing Factors to Inappropriate or Non-Urgent Alerts 
Definition: Adjudicator’s determination of patient, medication, or laboratory characteristics that 
may indicate that a patient-drug alert is inappropriate or not urgent.  Determinations are made at 
the time that the alert was first displayed for each eligible medication order using resources 
available at that time. 
c. Patient Characteristics 
i. Dialysis patient 
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ii. Transplant patient 
iii. Palliative care patient 
d. Medication Characteristics 
i. Dose already adjusted for AKI 
ii. Dose is already low and for prophylaxis 
iii. Drug levels are in therapeutic range 
iv. Primary team has documented AKI risk and drug benefit 
e. Laboratory Characteristics 
i. Transient AKI 
ii. No AKI – lab error 
iii. No AKI – drug interference with serum creatinine assay 
iv. No AKI – insufficient change in GFR 
I. Provider Response 
Definition: Actual provider response and expected provider response by nephrologist to alerted 
medication, regardless of alert appropriateness or urgency.  Determinations are made by first 
evaluating for responses made in the context of the final displayed alert (i.e. provider selected 
modify, discontinue, defer, correct dose).  If alerts were continually deferred and no response was 
made through the alert, determinations are made by evaluating the patient’s ordering history for a 
response made in a later ordering session, within 24 hours of the final displayed alert. 
Type (Select all that apply) (Determined Electronically) 
i. Provider did not respond (i.e. continued deferral) 
ii. Provider selected “Correct Dose” 
iii. Provider modified the drug dose 
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iv. Provider modified the drug interval 
v. Provider discontinued the drug 
vi. Provider monitored drug levels 
vii. Provider monitored serum creatinine levels 
viii. Provider monitored other levels 
Timing (Determined Electronically) 
ix. Provider did not respond 
x. Provider responded immediately 
xi. Provider responded within 24 hours 
xii. Provider delayed response for > 24 hours 
b. Adjudication 
i. Provider response was unacceptable 
ii. Provider response was acceptable 
c. Expected Response Type  (Select all that apply) 
i. Provider should not have changed therapy 
Example: If dose is sufficiently low or already adjusted, no change is necessary. 
ii. Provider should have modified the drug dose or interval 
iii. Provider should have documented indication 
iv. Provider should have discontinued the drug 
Example: Absolute contraindications should always be discontinued 
v. Provider should have monitored drug levels 
Example:  Drugs in which levels can be checked and used for monitor purposes 
should always have levels monitored 
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vi. Provider should have monitored serum creatinine levels 
Example: Serum creatinine should always be monitored on a daily basis. 
vii. Provider should have monitored other levels 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADVERSE DRUG EVENT ADJUDICATION 
I. Potential Adverse Drug Event (pADE) 
Definition: an incident with potential for injury related to a drug 
a. Type 
i. Contraindicated use for > 24 hours 
ii. No dose adjustment for > 24 hours 
iii. No interval adjustment for > 24 hours 
iv. Ineffective at low CrCl 
v. Administration error 
vi. No drug level monitoring 
vii. No potassium monitoring 
viii. No creatinine monitoring 
ix. No other monitoring 
x. Other 
I. Adverse Drug Event (ADE) or Lab-Only ADE (Intermediate Outcome) 
Definition: an injury resulting from a medical intervention related to a drug 
b. Preventability 
i. Definitely preventable 
ii. Probably preventable 
iii. Probably not preventable 
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iv. Definitely not preventable 
c. Lab-Only ADE Type 
i. Hyperkalemia (K > 5.3 mEQ/L) 
ii. Hypokalemia 
iii. Hypernatremia 
iv. Hyponatremia 
v. Toxic Drug Levels 
Examples: 
1. Vancomycin Trough < 10mg/dl or > 25mg/dl 
2. Amikacin Extended Interval Dosing Trough > 2mcg/ml  
OR Traditional Dosing Trough > 10mcg/ml 
3. Gentamicin/Tobramycin Extended Interval Dosing: Trough> 0.5mcg/ml  
OR Traditional Dosing: Trough > 2mcg/ml 
4. Digoxin > 1.7 ng/ml 
5. Lithium > 1.2 mmol/L 
6. Procainamide > 12 mcg/ml 
vi. Subtherapeutic Drug Levels 
vii. Hypoglycemia (Asymptomatic) 
viii. Other 
d. ADE Type 
i. Bradyarrhythmia – Heart Rate < 60 beats/min OR Administration of Atropine 
with documented reason of bradycardia 
 81 
 
ii. Hypotension – Systolic < 90mmHg OR Diastolic < 60mmHg OR MAP < 65mmHg 
OR Receipt of systemic vasopressor (Norepinephrine, Phenylephrine, Dopamine 
> 5mcg/kg/min, Epinephrine, Vasopressin) 
iii. QT Prolongation – QTc interval on EKG > 440msec 
iv. Cognitive Changes/Somnolence – CAM-ICU+  OR Documented Cognitive changes 
in chart 
v. Delirium 
vi. EPS/Movement Disorders 
vii. Oversedation – RASS below daily set goal OR RASS < -3 (moderate sedation: 
Movement but no eye contact to voice) OR Receipt of Opiate antagonist or 
Flumazenil OR Documented oversedation in chart 
viii. Seizure 
ix. Rash 
x. Hypoglycemia (Symptomatic) – < 70mg/dl OR Administration of D50W for 
documented symptoms OR <40mg/dl (severe) 
xi. Pancreatitis – (N/V AND Amylase) AND/OR (Lipase > Upper limit of normal range 
AND chart documentation) 
xii. Diarrhea 
xiii. Anemia – Men: Hgb < 13g/dl; Women: Hgb < 12g/dl 
xiv. Lactic Acidosis – Lactate >4mmol/L OR Lactate >5mmol/L + ABG pH< 7.35 
xv. Major Bleed – Known or suspected Bleed site AND Hgb decrease >5 g/dl 
xvi. Minor Bleed – Known Bleed site AND Hgb decrease > 3 g/dl but <5g/dl 
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xvii. Neutropenia – Platelets <150,000 cells/mm3 OR 50% decrease in Platelets from 
admission 
xviii. Thrombocytopenia 
xix. Neuromuscular Control 
xx. Vision Changes 
xxi. Hearing Loss 
xxii. Tinnitus 
xxiii. Acute Kidney Injury 
xxiv. Crystalurea 
xxv. Renal Replacement Therapy 
xxvi. Volume Overload 
xxvii. Respiratory Depression 
xxviii. Death 
xxix. Other 
e. Severity of pADE or ADE 
Definition: this is the degree of patient harm that could be caused by the above pADE or 
ADE 
i. Significant: an error that can cause patient symptoms that, while harmful to the 
patient, pose little or no threat to the patient’s life function  
Examples: 
1. Dose of the drug with low therapeutic index is too high (i.e. ½ to 4x the 
normal dose) 
2. Dose is too low for a patient with the condition being treated 
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3. Wrong laboratory studies to monitor a specific side effect of the drug 
are ordered 
4. The wrong route of administration for the condition being treated is 
ordered 
ii. Serious: an error that can cause signs/symptoms that are associated with a 
serious level of risk that is not high enough to be life-threatening.  In addition, it 
is serious if it can cause persistent alteration of daily function  
Examples:  
1. Route is inappropriate with the potential of causing a severe toxic 
reaction 
2. Dose is too low for a patient with serious disease who is in acute 
distress 
3. Dose with low therapeutic index is too high (i.e. four to ten times the 
normal dose) 
4. Dose of the drug would result in serum drug levels in the toxic range 
5. Drug could exacerbate the patient’s condition (e.g. drug-drug 
interaction or drug-disease interaction) 
iii. Life-threatening: an error that can cause signs/symptoms that if not treated 
would put the patient at risk of death 
Examples: 
1. Drug level is likely to be in the severe toxicity range based on common 
dosage guidelines 
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2. Drug order has a high potential to cause cardiopulmonary arrest or life-
threatening adverse reaction (e.g. anaphylaxis) 
3. Dose of potentially life-saving drug is too low for a patient having the 
disease treated 
4. Dose of a drug with a very low therapeutic index is too high (i.e. 10x the 
normal dose) 
iv. Fatal: an error that caused the patient’s death 
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APPENDIX C 
GREASEMONKEY SCRIPT FOR BLINDED STUDY PERSONNEL CHART REVIEW 
// ==UserScript== 
// @name           Hide Notes 
// @namespace      http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/ 
// @include        https://*.mc.vanderbilt.edu/cgi-bin/sp/* 
// ==/UserScript== 
 
unsafeWindow.hideAKINotes = function() { 
  var s = document.getElementsByTagName('span'); 
  for (i = 0; i < s.length; i++) { 
   if (s[i].getAttribute('styp') == 'Pharmacy Recommendation') { 
    s[i].style.display="none"; 
    s[i].previousSibling.style.display="none"; 
   } 
  } 
} 
 
var chart = document.getElementById('PC2'); 
if (chart != null) { 
 chart.addEventListener('load', function() { 
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  var s = chart.contentDocument.getElementsByTagName('span'); 
  for (i = 0; i < s.length; i++) { 
   if (s[i].getAttribute('styp') == 'Pharmacy Recommendation') { 
    s[i].style.display="none"; 
    s[i].previousSibling.style.display="none"; 
   } 
 
   if (s[i].getAttribute('class') == 'Tab') { 
    var oc = s[i].getAttribute('oc').replace(/"/g, "'"); 
    s[i].setAttribute('oc', oc + '; hideAKINotes();'); 
   } 
  } 
 } , false); 
} 
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